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My aim is to present a view on how military creativity and innovation occur, a 
view that draws on four lines of creativity research. This thesis explores whether factors 
found to influence creativity in this wide field of research can help explain military 
innovation. Although creativity research has roots in the military, it currently follows a 
different path than military innovation studies. While the creativity research drinks from 
a well of knowledge shared by the fields of psychology, neuroscience, organizational 
behavior, education, management, and so forth, the authors of military innovation studies 
develop concepts and theories in relative isolation. The thesis uses a descriptive case 
study approach, and formulates a theoretical framework to describe the conditions that set 
the stage for creativity and innovation onboard the USS Nimitz. 
Guided by the framework, this case study shows that there are strong forces in the 
Navy resisting change and defending the status quo. Still, it is possible to outmaneuver 
the hierarchy and bring ideas and suggestions straight to the commanding officer’s 
attention. Faced with a rigid, conservative culture, USS Nimitz managed to create a 
climate of intrinsic motivation where individuals believed their ideas could make a 
difference and acted on those beliefs. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION .......................................................1 
1. Creativity ........................................................................................2 
B. WHY THE MILITARY? ..........................................................................8 
C. SCOPE ......................................................................................................10 
D. COURSE OF STUDY ..............................................................................11 
E. THE ROLE OF CREATIVITY IN HUMAN SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION (HSI) AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH (OR) ......12 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................15 
A. MILITARY INNOVATION ...................................................................16 
B. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT .................................................18 
C. THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES ......................................................22 
1. The Dialectic Approach to Creativity ........................................22 
a. Process View of Creativity ................................................25 
b. Investment Theory.............................................................26 
2. Factor Theory ...............................................................................27 
a. Individual Factors .............................................................28 
b. Team/Groups .....................................................................30 
c. Organization/Culture ........................................................34 
D. BATEY’S MODEL OF CREATIVITY .................................................36 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................38 
III. ON CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY .............................................................41 
A. THE ROLE OF CASE STUDIES IN HSI .............................................41 
B. PRACTICAL USE OF CASE STUDY METHODS IN AN HSI 
SETTING ..................................................................................................43 
C. TYPES OF CASE STUDIES ..................................................................45 
1. Descriptive ....................................................................................45 
2. Explanatory ..................................................................................46 
3. Exploratory ...................................................................................46 
D. STRENGTHS/CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE STUDY 
METHOD .................................................................................................47 
1. A Deep Scope and a Heterogeneous Population .......................49 
2. A Rare Incident ............................................................................49 
3. Causal Insights .............................................................................50 
4. Internal Validity ...........................................................................50 
 viii 
E. CASE SELECTION.................................................................................50 
F. DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................52 
G. CLOSING .................................................................................................53 
IV. THE USS NIMITZ ...............................................................................................55 
A. CONTEXT ................................................................................................55 
1. The Navy .......................................................................................55 
2. The Ship ........................................................................................58 
3. The Innovation .............................................................................61 
B. THE APPLICATION OF THEORIES ..................................................62 
1. Individual Factors ........................................................................63 
a. The Leader.........................................................................63 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................64 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................65 
2. Team/Groups ................................................................................66 
a. The Leader.........................................................................66 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................67 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................67 
3. Organization/Culture ..................................................................68 
a. The Leader.........................................................................68 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................69 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................70 
4. Dialectic Approach .......................................................................72 
a. The Leader.........................................................................72 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................72 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................73 
5. Investment Theory .......................................................................73 
a. The Leader.........................................................................73 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................75 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................75 
6. Process View .................................................................................76 
a. The Leader.........................................................................76 
b. The Athena Sailor .............................................................77 
c. The Petty Officer ...............................................................78 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................79 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................81 
A. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ......................................................81 
1. Definitions and Measurements ...................................................81 
2. Factor Theory ...............................................................................82 
 ix 
3. The Dialectic Approach ...............................................................83 
4. Investment Theory .......................................................................83 
5. Process View .................................................................................84 
B. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................84 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................87 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Creativity Research Heuristic (adapted from Batey, 2012) .........................7 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Individual Factors of Creativity (from Guilford, 1950; Sternberg, 
2006) ..........................................................................................................29 
Table 2. Team Factors (from Amabile et al., 1996; Anderson & West, 1998) ........32 
Table 3. Inhibitors of Creative Potential in Teams (from Paulus, 2000) .................33 
Table 4. Summary Table ..........................................................................................39 
Table 5. Case Study and Cross-Case Research Designs: Considerations 
(adapted from Gerring, 2007, p. 38) ..........................................................48 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
1MC 1 Main Circuit  
3MC Maintenance Material Management Coordinator 
3MO Maintenance Material Management Officer 
4 Ps Person, Process, Press, Product 
ADP Automated Data Processing 
CMC Command Master Chief 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
CO Commanding Officer 
CRIC CNO’s Rapid Innovation Cell 
CTA Cognitive Task Analysis 
DITS Division in the Spotlight 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
GEN General 
HSI Human Systems Integration 
IT Information Technology 
LT Lieutenant 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
OR Operations Research 
R&D Research and Development 
RO Reactor Officer 
Ro-ro Roll-On/Roll-Off 
SAMS SNAP Automated Medical Systems 
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SNAP Ship Board Non-Tactical ATP Program 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
TCI Team Climate Inventory 
USS United States Ship 
UUT Unusual Uses Task 
XO Executive Officer 
 xvi 




The U.S. Navy needs creative ideas and innovative products to adapt to changing 
times and novel threats. Unfortunately, the Navy is an organization that struggles 
between forces defying change and its need for innovation. There are multiple obstacles 
to overcome for an idea to surface or new products to be implemented in a military 
organization. 
My aim here is to present a view on how military creativity and innovation occur, 
a view that draws on four lines of creativity research. This thesis explores whether factors 
found to influence creativity in this wide field of research can help explain innovation in 
military organizations. Creativity research is used herein as an all-encompassing term 
embracing research into creativity and innovation. Creativity research spans multiple 
fields of expertise including human factors, management, organizational behavior, 
psychology, and neuroscience. For this project, these areas of research are gathered under 
one umbrella both for the sake of simplicity and, more importantly, to distinguish 
creativity research from studies of military innovation. These two streams follow 
different paths: creativity research benefits from insights from the wide range of fields 
mentioned above, while the military innovation studies develop concepts and theories in 
relative isolation. Just as creativity research seldom uses military cases as a unit of 
analysis, studies of military innovation very rarely use concepts, theories, and definitions 
from creativity research to explain their observations. The enablers of creativity and 
innovation—in military organizations and elsewhere—are best understood in light of the 
insights from creativity research.  
Herein, theories from creativity research are applied to the need for innovations in 
the Navy as exemplified by the USS Nimitz. The thesis uses a descriptive case study 
approach to understand creativity and innovation onboard that particular ship. Following 
that approach, the thesis presents a theoretical framework which is used to view the case 
from different angles. The use of theory makes the findings accessible and therefore 
relevant to other cases as well. Theory drives the collection and interpretation of data 
about the case. Triangulation is used to strengthen the analysis. 
 xviii 
The case study methodology was chosen because of its ability to capture the 
complexity and uniqueness of human behavior in a real-world context. The rarity and 
heterogeneity of such a study in a naval context further strengthened the rationale for 
choosing a case study research design.  
Data were gathered primarily through unstructured, one-on-one interviews with a 
selection of key personnel onboard the Nimitz. To ensure that the sample was 
representative, the snowball recruiting method was used. The participants included the 
ship’s leadership, a sample of experienced petty officers from one particular ship 
division, and participants and facilitators of an innovation project initiated onboard (the 
Athena Project). Reports from previous NPS research on the Nimitz and observations 
made during that research provided valuable background and context descriptions, which 
are supported by two personal visits to the ship and 18 years of professional naval 
background. 
The personal stories gathered through interviews were the primary source of 
evidence, while observations and secondary sources were valuable in supporting the 
context and background descriptions. The interview data were interpreted in light of the 
theoretical framework. The data have been organized by the theories underlying that 
framework. Furthermore, the participants interviewed have been organized by three 
perspectives. This organization is inspired by how ethnographic researchers create 
personas, or archetypes, representing important and distinct characters that stand out from 
the interview data. The three perspectives are the Leader, the Athena Sailor, and the Petty 
Officer. 
Guided by the framework, the case study showed that there are strong forces in 
the Navy resisting change and defending the status quo. It is challenging to implement 
new ideas. Still, it is possible to outmaneuver the hierarchy and bring ideas and 
suggestions straight to the commanding officer’s table. Faced with the most conservative 
culture, it is possible to create a climate of intrinsic motivation where individuals believe 
their ideas can make a difference. 
 xix 
The USS Nimitz innovated by adhering to factors such as intrinsic motivation and 
participative safety. By that measure, the case study echoed the findings of broad 
creativity research. Other factors, like transactional leadership, were more rarely given 
priority by previous studies. The unique military context of the case study made the role 
of transactional leadership more apparent. More surprising was how clear the process 
view illuminated the difference in the Nimitz’s approaches to idea generation and 
implementation. Initiatives like the Athena Project made the generation of new ideas 
considerably more effective. On the other hand, the implementation of those potentially 
radical ideas was entrusted to the established, traditional process. Finally, mostly 
unexpected was the insight about the positive effect that the alignment of goals and ideas 
had on participative safety. When goals and ideas were aligned, the crew of the Nimitz 
was able to innovate by taking advantage of existing efficient processes. 
 xx 
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Like many large organizations, the U.S. Navy needs creative ideas and innovative 
products to adapt to changing times and novel threats. The Navy also has a long tradition 
of struggling to embrace opportunities to innovate. There are multiple obstacles to 
overcome for an idea to surface or a new product to be implemented in a military 
organization. There are notable exceptions: Some ship crews are willing to try innovative 
solutions; however, many fiercely resist change. The majority lies dead in water: unable 
or unwilling to innovate or unaware of opportunities. What sets the innovative few apart 
from the others? The overriding question posed by this research is: What conditions set 
the stage for creativity and innovation in the Navy? This thesis explores one of those 
cases. 
A. CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 
My aim here is to present a view on how military creativity and innovation occur 
that draws on current developments in creativity research. Creativity research is used 
herein as an all-encompassing term embracing research into creativity and innovation. 
Creativity research spans multiple fields of expertise including human factors, 
management, organizational behavior, psychology, and neuroscience. For this project, 
these areas of research are gathered under one umbrella both for the sake of simplicity 
and, more importantly, to distinguish creativity research from studies of military 
innovation. These two streams follow different paths: creativity research benefits from 
insights from the wide range of fields mentioned above, while the military innovation 
studies develop concepts and theories in relative isolation. Just as creativity research 
seldom uses military cases as a unit of analysis, studies of military innovation very rarely 
use concepts, theories, and definitions from creativity research to explain their 
observations. The enablers of creativity and innovation—in military organizations and 
elsewhere—are best understood in light of the insights from creativity research. This 
thesis explores whether factors found to influence creativity in this wide field of research 
can help explain innovation in military organizations. 
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A majority of researchers (e.g., Hennessey & Amabile, 2010) on creativity argue 
that if creativity is the generation of novel and useful ideas (p. 570), innovation is the 
successful implementation of those ideas (p. 585). The distinction can be useful in 
addressing seemingly conflicting findings regarding the conditions necessary for 
creativity and innovation, and thereby provide more precision in addressing the topic. 
However, focusing solely on one of the two may result in gaining only a partial 
understanding of two closely related terms. After all, innovation cannot be achieved 
without prior creative efforts (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). As 
explained by Klijn and Tomic (2010), “So to be able to promote innovation, it is 
important to understand the process of creativity and its mediators.” (p. 323) Herein, 
innovation is understood as the implementation phase of novel and useful ideas generated 
through creative behavior. 
Traditional creativity research views creativity as a characteristic of the individual 
(Guilford, 1950; Torrance, 1965). More recent research has widened the scope to include 
the characteristics of team, organizational, and even cultural environments (Anderson & 
West, 1998; Elenkov & Manev, 2005; D. Jung, Wu, & Chow, 2008). With such a broad 
scope, conflicting factors contributing to creativity have been found, and theories to 
address these issues have been developed. The research on creativity in a military context 
is sparse, however, and is based more on narratives of single cases of innovation. 
Understanding the role of organizations in fostering creativity and innovation is 
especially important to military operations. Findings from creativity research could help 
broaden the understanding of creativity and innovation in the military, and bring the two 
fields closer together. 
1. Creativity 
There are multiple ways to define creativity. A common broad definition is that of 
novelty and quality: A creative accomplishment is judged to be both original and useful 
(Batey, 2012). Creativity has been linked to the most important scientific and cultural 
achievements, for example the discovery of DNA, or works of art by Mozart, the Beatles 
and Picasso (Weisberg, 2006). Early research into creativity found that these 
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breakthroughs could be attributed to more than individual intelligence as it is normally 
measured, and sparked an interest in uncovering the source from which creativity 
emerges (Guilford, 1950). The quest was on to learn what enabled creative geniuses such 
as Michelangelo, Watson and Crick, Darwin, Monet, van Gogh, and Einstein to achieve 
such extraordinary results, and how to identify and enhance similar potential among more 
ordinary individuals. One consistent finding is that innovative results are seldom 
achieved without inspiration, collaboration, and communication (Sawyer, 2007).  
In this same manner, creativity research turned its focus also to innovation, social 
entities, and organizations. Extensive research has been conducted to understand the 
necessary conditions for creativity to thrive not just in individuals, but also in teams, 
groups, and organizations (e.g., Amabile et al., 1996; Anderson & West, 1998). In the 
business world, results come from being innovative, staying ahead of the competition, 
and adapting quickly to market needs. The market rewards those who are able to innovate 
and stay in front. Innovation is a means of survival, growth, and long-term performance 
(Klijn & Tomic, 2010). Exemplar firms have been promoted as having adopted highly 
creative practices. These innovations include flat organization structures, team diversity, 
risk taking, individual initiative, freedom to explore, information sharing, and playfulness 
and have been implemented by companies such as Google, IDEO, 3M, Gore, Semco, and 
Lego (Sawyer, 2007). 
Lessons learned from creativity research studying primarily civilian entities 
should be just as applicable to military organizations. In fact, Human Systems Integration 
(HSI) relies on integrating into military organizations lessons learned from diverse fields 
of research that focus on studying individuals, organizations, and incidents outside the 
military sphere (Krueger, 2012). For example, studies of firefighters are used to 
understand military decision making (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). 
Cases from health care and tire manufactures are used to inform military manpower, 
personnel, and training issues (Archer, Headley, & Allender, 2005). It would be 
unthinkable in HSI not to use insights from psychology, organizational behavior, human 
factors, management, and so forth to make sense of observations and studies of the 
military. 
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To investigate whether this observation also holds true for insights from creativity 
research, we need a model—a common language—of creativity and innovation that we 
can fit later to a case study of military innovation. 
We have already established definitions of creativity and innovation, and 
determined that they are separate, yet closely related, terms. Distinguishing between them 
will provide more precision when related effects surface during the course of the case 
study, effects that may appear conflicting when creativity and innovation are melded 
together. Nevertheless, that these conflicts exist justifies a discussion beyond our initial 
high-level, broad definition. 
There are paradoxes in creativity and innovation that point to a dialectic process 
that can be found in studies of culture, psychology, and neuroscience (Holm-Hadulla, 
2013). The creative process introduces new ideas to adjust current knowledge in a thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis model (Sternberg, 2001). Building on that model, in the 
investment theory of creativity, Sternberg (2006) proposes that divergent thinking skills 
are essential in generating new, useful ideas, while, simultaneously, convergent thinking 
skills are required to realize and sell the product or idea to an audience still getting by on 
old, established beliefs.  
The dialectic process of creativity and innovation can be examined with the aim 
of identifying management practices or potential challenges produced by the tension 
between seemingly conflicting demands. Bledow, Frese, Anderson, Erez, and Farr (2009) 
reviewed organization and management research to come up with principles that support 
innovation management. For example, they identified principles aimed at addressing the 
tension between the need for organizational conformity and stereotypes versus open-
mindedness and change. In another attempt to address this inherent complexity of 
creativity and innovation, Cropley and Cropley (2012) use a process view of creativity. 
The dialectic approach, supported by the investment theory and the process view, are 
perspectives that were chosen to provide more depth and insight into the understanding of 
creativity and innovation in the case selected for the thesis. 
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These perspectives also suggest that the thesis should look into the creative idea 
itself and its relation to the context: how the idea that eventually resulted in new practice 
emerged (the idea generating process), and how innovative or radical it was perceived to 
be (the investment/risk it produces). Moreover, management processes are studied to 
uncover how the leadership managed the conflicting demands that emerged during the 
creative process. 
This understanding of creativity and innovation is the foundation for a theoretical 
framework to guide the collection, interpretation, and communication of the data. The 
next step is to look at how creativity research can be organized. Two common taxonomic 
structures in creativity research are the 4 Ps and level of analysis. 
Traditionally, creativity has been studied in terms of person, process, press, and 
product, commonly referred to as the “4 Ps of creativity” (Runco, 2004). Although 
modern creativity research has widened the scope considerably, the 4 Ps are still the 
foundation upon which this thesis builds: 
• Person: Which human traits or states are associated with creativity? 
• Process: What are the psychological processes that support creativity? 
• Press: How does the environment influence creative persons? 
• Product: How can creative products be categorized and measured? 
One of the more important developments in creativity research is the step from 
studying individuals (person) to teams, organizations, and cultures. Consequently, 
summary articles and literature reviews are organized according to those levels (e.g., 
Anderson, Potocnik, & Zhou, 2014; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Klijn & Tomic, 2010).  
At the individual level, researchers have measured the effect of cognitive 
processes, personality, traits, mood, or motivation on factors hypothesized to influence 
creativity and innovation. One example of such studies is the effect of incubation periods 
(mind-wandering) on creativity among students (Baird et al., 2012). For groups and 
teams, researchers have looked into the effect of team work, social climate, demands, 
task characteristics, team diversity, structure, and so forth, on creativity. Two notable 
examples of such efforts are found in Amabile et al. (1996) and West (2002). At the 
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organizational level, organizations have been assessed as hierarchical, risk adverse, goal 
setting, resourceful, and communicative (Anderson et al., 2014). Finally, cultures have 
been studied and found to be prone to collectivism rather than individualism, or to be 
restrictive in nature, through the promotion of censorship and tight corporate control 
(Elenkov & Manev, 2005; Seitz, 2003). 
 For all levels of abstraction (from individual to cultural), researchers have 
analyzed the factors that they hypothesize will have the greatest influence on creativity 
and innovation. To understand the complete picture, however, it is important to consider 
the possibility of interactions between the levels. When summarizing research on 
different levels of analysis (in this particular case, neurological, group/teams, 
organization, and culture), Hennessy and Amabile (2010) argue that a systems view must 
be taken. Creativity cannot be dissected to the sum of the effects found at each level, but 
is an emergent property of the interactions of the whole. This statement implies that the 
suggested predictors for each level are not synonymous with creativity per se; they 
merely imply its potential. For example, divergent thinking is found to foster originality. 
As an essential springboard for creativity, divergent thinking is a factor frequently 
measured in studies of creativity, and may or may not be predictive of creative outcomes 
(Runco & Acar, 2012). Taking the approach of systems theory means that separate 
analysis of all the measurable factors found to influence creativity at different levels of 
granularity does not guarantee a complete understanding of innovation as an emergent 
property of the system. 
Batey (2012) observes that creativity research typically considers either 
individuals, team, organization, or culture as the level of analysis. Within each level, 
researchers investigate four facets - trait, process, press, or product (similar to the 4 Ps 
model). Data are gathered using subjective, objective, or other measurement approaches. 
A common self-report approach uses the KEYS survey tool to measure social climate in a 
project team (Amabile et al., 1996). As a heuristic to understand creativity research, 
Batey presents a model using Level, Facet, and Measurement Approach as the three 
planes of a cube, or as the x, y, and z axes of a three-dimensional coordinate system (see 
Figure 1). Creativity research typically develops its hypothesis about an intersection point 
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of the three axes, although this intersection point can represent only a fraction of the 
whole picture of creativity and innovation. Similar to the understanding of creativity and 
innovation in systems theory (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010), Batey suggests that 
creativity is more likely the whole picture of everything surrounding the points measured. 
 
Figure 1.  Creativity Research Heuristic (adapted from Batey, 2012) 
Batey’s model of multiple levels of abstraction, facets of creativity and 
measurement approaches inspires the search for system-wide effects in this thesis. The 
model brings together both the 4 Ps and the levels of abstraction. It can be used to 
describe very narrowly focused research concentrating on only one intersection point or 
to justify a whole system approach. The definitions of creativity and innovation, and the 
perspectives of a dialectic approach, a process view, and the investment theory serve to 
provide precision, depth, and hopefully a richer understanding when applying the model 
to the case study. Hence, the understanding of creativity and innovation suggested here, 
and the different aspects of the model are used to make sense of observations, guide 
interview questions, and introduce a language for thinking and talking about military 
innovation. 
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Given this foundation, it is reasonable to expect to discover system properties in 
case studies of real-world military events. For example, there are likely to be interactions 
between multiple levels rather than a single main effect that might be isolated in a 
laboratory environment. A simple measurement of a trait at the individual, team, or 
organizational level is unlikely to explain how innovation occurred in the particular case 
that is studied. A linear cause-and-effect relationship might not be easily identified. 
Complex interactions may be present. Consequently, this study aims to capture as rich 
and diverse data as possible by using case study methodology. 
B. WHY THE MILITARY? 
Like their civilian counterparts, military organizations rely on being able to adapt 
to a rapidly changing environment and outsmart their competitors. New enemies, old 
enemies in new wrapping, and an ever-changing domestic and international political 
climate justify the catchphrase “innovate or die” to describe the reality facing military 
organizations (Spulak, 2010). However, military organizational culture seldom adopts the 
exemplar practices mentioned here. Military organizations value uniformity, hierarchy, 
risk reduction, orders, and standard operating procedures—all features that are known to 
degrade innovation and creativity (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2005). Fortunately, even from 
such poor soil, creativity can bloom. Yet, creativity research provides few answers on 
how innovation can happen in an environment that appears so different from the role-
model firms often promoted as fostering creativity. Creativity research mostly overlooks 
the military. Similarly, research done on military innovation ignores both the methods 
and findings of creativity research. However, I have found no evidence to suggest that 
lessons learned from creativity research cannot benefit the military. This thesis is novel in 
how it attempts to use general models from creativity research to shed light on a case of 
military innovation. 
A prevalent assumption is that the military organization is a machine bureaucracy: 
complex, hierarchical, and bureaucratic. This organizational structure is poor at 
promoting innovation (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2005). Even so, the military is able to, and 
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needs to, innovate. One example of naval innovation is changing the current routine of 
watch schedules onboard Navy ships. 
The Navy does not rest. It is constantly challenged to perform. If it fails, it will 
soon find itself in the wake of adversaries steaming ahead. Sailors, on the other hand, 
need rest and recovery, but current practice does not necessarily provide sailors with the 
rest they need to perform at their optimal capacity.  
Researchers from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have demonstrated the 
effect of watch schedules and sleep habits on human performance. The effort has 
influenced a change in watch schedules on some U.S. Navy ships. When the leadership of 
the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz suspected they were witnessing degraded 
performance levels among some crewmembers, they decided to invite NPS onboard to 
measure the crew’s sleep quality and performance. The studies inspired changes in their 
work schedules and also other routines thought to impact fatigue, rest, and performance. 
Ultimately, the mindset towards the importance of a proper balance between work and 
recovery was changing. This change is a major achievement considering how it 
challenges deeply-rooted traditional belief systems about sleep requirements in the 
military. It signifies a true innovation, an anti-thesis challenging the established order (the 
current thesis) followed by the synthesis of new and old knowledge into novel and useful 
solutions. This documented case of innovation provides an excellent opportunity to study 
creativity in a military setting. Additionally, the Nimitz is among the world’s largest and 
most complex naval vessels and is therefore, on its own, an intriguing case to examine 
creative and innovative behavior. 
Creativity and innovation is crucial for organizational success (Klijn & Tomic, 
2010). Nevertheless, innovation can be a challenging investment. Barriers to change may 
make it seemingly impossible to improve on routines deeply rooted in tradition. The case 
study of innovation onboard the Nimitz shows that innovation is possible in a military 
context. By learning more of how a particular Navy vessel was able to innovate and adopt 
changes to its routines, the thesis may assist other ships in understanding the process of 




This thesis is driven by one overriding question: What conditions set the stage for 
creativity and innovation in the Navy?  
By using a case study of military innovation onboard the USS Nimitz, the thesis 
aims to investigate the circumstances under which a military organization with a climate 
that is seemingly so different from the ideal for fostering creativity is able to be 
innovative. The innovation is explained by predictors or factors found in creativity 
research. 
First, creativity research is examined to find what researchers have put forward as 
the conditions necessary for creativity and innovation. Military innovation studies are 
reviewed to establish whether there are inconsistencies between the creativity research 
and the specific military innovation research. Then a specific case of military innovation 
is examined to determine how findings from creativity research can be applied to real-
world military situations and to find out whether creativity and innovation in a military 
context can benefit from being viewed through the lens of creativity research. 
The thesis is a case study of military innovation onboard a ship of the U.S. Navy, 
selected for its innovation in changing a well-established watch schedule onboard the 
ship. The thesis is limited to this one particular case: the USS Nimitz. The case is well-
documented by previous NPS research and, thus, there are rich sources of data to draw 
upon (Shattuck, Matsangas, & Brown, 2015; Shattuck, Matsangas, & Powley, 2015). 
Additional data collection consists of interviews of key personnel involved with the 
innovation. Since the interviews are conducted outside of a controllable, repeatable 
laboratory setting, the research provides only a glimpse of a world that may or may not 
be describable by the terms established by cross-case, large-sample-size, correlational 
research on creativity; although, most likely, current creativity research will help to 
expand the understanding of observations from the case study. 
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D. COURSE OF STUDY 
Type of study: Descriptive case study 
The thesis is conducted in three steps: 
1. Literature review 
2. Interviews/Case study 
3. Consolidation 
The literature review covers research on creativity from major publications and a 
wide range of disciplines. Relevant publications include dedicated journals on the 
subject, for example, the Creativity Research Journal, and the Journal of Creative 
Behavior, and peer-reviewed journals dedicated to related fields, such as the Journal of 
Management and the Journal of Applied Psychology. Notable authors include Amabile, 
West, Sternberg, Anderson, Bledow, and others. Research on military innovation is 
mostly covered by articles from the Journal of Strategic Studies. 
The case study is concentrated on the USS Nimitz. The ship discarded the 
traditional watch schedule, and implemented a new schedule, different from Navy 
standards, but better suited to human needs. The sheer size and complexity of the ship 
make it an interesting case study. Additionally, research teams from NPS studied the 
Nimitz on several occasions during 2014, and published several reports on their findings 
(Shattuck et al., 2015). The rich data available, although not on creativity per se, and the 
connections with key actors already established on the ship, make this an excellent 
opportunity for studying the links between innovation and creativity, and military 
organizations and minds. 
Data collection for the case study includes a combination of reviewing previous 
research and identifying and interviewing key actors in the innovation process. The 
interviews are open/semi-structured to allow for exploration of the subject. This 
technique facilitates the collection of richer data than is possible using questionnaires and 
structured interviews that are designed to compare and average views from a larger 
population. 
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Finally, following a descriptive case study methodology, the data from the cases 
are consolidated with the findings from the literature. This procedure aligns the 
narrow/focused military study with the broader research, and enables lessons learned to 
be integrated in future research. 
E. THE ROLE OF CREATIVITY IN HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
(HSI) AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH (OR) 
Both the topic and outline of this thesis deviates some from the typical HSI thesis. 
No previous NPS HSI (or Operations Research) thesis has taken on the theme of 
creativity.1 Also, unlike the majority of NPS HSI theses, it does not aim to define or 
refine the HSI process, nor does it seek to demonstrate how aspects of a problem pertain 
to or influence the understanding of particular domains of HSI. Hence, an orientation on 
how the topic pertains to the study of HSI is in order.  
First of all, the reader should be left with an understanding that creativity, as with 
HSI, is a mindset: a way of thinking about human performance. Both creativity and HSI 
are holistic approaches that place human performance in their center—HSI in the 
broadest sense, creativity in a more focused sense. In the literature review, the HSI 
practitioner will recognize the importance of individual factors, team performance, and 
organizational behavior, as well as the presence of complex interactions in human 
systems and tradeoff decisions necessary to produce innovative products. With this in 
mind, it should be evident that creativity can be seen as a product of good HSI. Efforts in 
the domains of manpower, personnel, training and human factor engineering can produce 
creative behavior as a primary outcome. The methods described in Chapter III reveal a 
methodology familiar to the HSI mind: the case study. HSI recognizes the value of 
                                                 
1 This statement is based on a search of the Calhoun database of NPS publications, accessed May 12, 
2015. A search within the HSI department of all publications that some way or another include the word 
“creativity” obtained seven publications, “innovation” obtained six, “creativity AND innovation” four. 
These were publications only mentioning the words; none of the publications treated creativity or 
innovation as research topics. An expansion of the search to the entire Operations Research department 
yielded the following results: “creativity” 34 results, “innovation” 101 results, “creativity AND innovation” 
10 results. None of these results had the word creativity in the abstract, whereas five mentioned innovation 
in the abstract (without treating it as a topic on its own). The results are not adjusted for the presence of 
duplicates. 
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separately studying influential, unique, rare, or complex events in case studies. The case 
studied in the subsequent chapter reveals how creativity in certain HSI domains can result 
in improved total system performance. The discussion amplifies an understanding of how 
human performance (creativity) is achieved in a military system. Lastly, the conclusion 
demonstrates how creativity and innovation can take HSI forward, and that the study of 
creativity and innovation in the context of a military system is a study of HSI. 
Second, the reader should be left with an appreciation of the power of 
observational research and theory-driven qualitative analysis. Creativity and innovation 
arise spontaneously in uncontrolled, naturalistic environments. They are rare and must be 
uncovered using qualitative inquiry and analysis. Creativity resists experimental 
manipulation, random assignment, and the quantitative rigor of the methods that 
dominate the Operations Research curriculum. The case study methodology used here fits 
the domain of study far better than quantitative analytic techniques. As such, this thesis 
departs from the typical OR thesis template. Case studies are not uncommon within OR, 
but OR case studies typically examine phenomena were casual effects are well defined 
and quantifiable, historical data are available. Two examples illustrating such studies are 
a case study using historical maintenance data (e.g., failure rates) of a particular type of 
pump to better understand the wider field of age-replacement policies (Gaver, Jacobs, & 
Dudenhoeffer, 1997), and a case study using algorithms from search theory to develop a 
model of the deployment of assets during Maritime Interdiction Operations (Kress, 
Royset, & Rozen, 2012). Historical, numerical data and established algorithms are rare in 
the field of creativity research. In time, once additional case studies of creativity and 
innovation in the military have been conducted, a meta-analysis will likely apply more 
traditional OR methods to uncover the factors that enable and inhibit creativity and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A descriptive case study uses a theoretical framework to describe and examine a 
phenomenon. The framework guides the collection and interpretation of the data from the 
case study, and provides a means to communicate the results. The review of creativity 
research in this chapter provides that framework. To strengthen their argument, case 
study researchers use theory triangulation (Stake, 1995). Herein, multiple theories and 
perspectives are used to shed light on creativity and innovation in the Navy from different 
angles. 
The discussion of the many ways to define and measure creativity and innovation 
tells us that every interview subject may have his or her unique understanding of what 
creativity and innovation mean. It also reveals the importance of using very precise 
terminology when communicating the results.  
Four theories collectively form the foundation for the interpretive framework 
applied in Chapter IV. The four theories are the dialectic approach, process view, 
investment theory, and factor theory. Batey’s model of creativity is the overarching 
model that visually ties the four theories together. 
Scholars of the dialectic approach to creativity observed that some factors exhibit 
both a positive and negative relationship to creativity and innovation. The process view 
interprets creativity and innovation as a stage model with sequential phases, while the 
investment theory implies that there is a cost associated with being innovative. Both the 
process view and investment theory provide additional perspectives on why creativity 
and innovation have dialectic properties.  
Factor theory is the fourth cornerstone of the foundation. It suggests that factors 
related to creativity and innovation can be found at many levels: at the individual, team, 
and organizational levels. Finally, Batey’s (2012) model of creativity pulls the framework 
together, and is presented as a heuristic to interpret the data. Having a theoretical 
framework is useful to inform observations and interview questions, to interpret the data 
and to communicate the results. As such, this study aligns with traditional case study 
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methodology which relies on interpretive frameworks for a theory relevant description of 
the case. The novelty of this thesis’ approach is to bring the theories described herein 
together when analyzing a case of military innovation. 
A. MILITARY INNOVATION 
The Navy wants creative and innovative sailors. The Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV) wants to promote innovation, but sees a large organization growing 
increasingly dependent on bureaucracy and processes that impose barriers on creative 
individuals within an American culture of innovation (Navy Office of Information, 
2015). But what does the SECNAV mean by creativity and innovation? How are those 
terms understood? Will the Navy be able to recognize them when they see them, and 
where should the SECNAV start to look? 
In this thesis, the literature’s foremost contribution is to offer a common language 
with which we can examine creativity and innovation in the case study and add to the 
insights of others. This chapter offers a review of literature that will hopefully help 
readers broaden their understanding of creativity and innovation. It concludes by 
proposing a model that can be used to apply that understanding to military cases. 
First, the chapter introduces military innovation studies to demonstrate how 
creativity research and military innovation studies have parted. Then follows a discussion 
of creativity and innovation and how these terms have been defined and measured. 
Following an introduction to four of the dominant theories of creativity and innovation, a 
framework is presented. This framework brings the four theories together and provides a 
language that can be used to better communicate the findings from the case study. 
While working with U.S. Army Air Corps pilot selection during the Second 
World War, J. P. Guilford (i.e., the “founding father” of creativity studies, and later 
president of the American Psychological Association) discovered that pilots selected for 
their ability to think out of the box survived more missions. Guilford initially selected 
pilots who gave the right answer to how to act when facing a certain threat, while, in 
contrast, a colleague of his deliberately selected pilots who answered more creatively. 
When examining later survival rates, Guilford found “his pilots” were the ones shot 
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down. His pilots had answered correctly according to the manual and their training, but 
by doing so they proved predictable and unable to improvise their way out of a dangerous 
situation. The training and selection had failed to predict enemy reactions to the behavior 
the training had produced. Guilford went on to change the selection criteria such that 
creativity was rewarded as a desired human attribute. Creativity, or the ability to think out 
of the box, was established as a criterion for survivability (British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2013). 
Though frequently cited in non-peer-reviewed media, this anecdote demonstrates 
that there was indeed a military presence in the field of creativity at the early stage of 
modern creativity research. Guilford served as a Colonel in the Army Air Corps and was 
Director of Psychology Research Unit 3 during the Second World War, conducting 
research on personality and pilot selection (Comrey, 1992; Flanagan, 1948). 
As one would expect, the field of creativity research has progressed tremendously 
since then. Numerous articles have been written in both dedicated journals (e.g., the 
Creativity Research Journal and the Journal of Creative Behavior) and peer-reviewed 
journals of related fields (e.g., the Journal of Applied Psychology and the Journal of 
Management). Nonetheless, research on creativity from a military perspective rarely 
appears. 
Published literature on creativity in a military context is generally limited to 
articles that either describe single instances of innovative thinking (e.g., Goulding, 2011) 
or that call for creativity to receive more attention in military training (van Echo, 2009). 
Some are historical narratives studying doctrinal development and the environment in 
which an innovation took place (for example Stirrup, 2005; Terriff, 2006). As discussed 
by Grissom (2006), the military innovation studies describe well the influence of cultural 
factors like bureaucracy, rivalry, and competition on innovation, but seem unaware of 
experiment-based creativity research that builds on Guilford’s psychometric approach.  
Peer-reviewed research touching on both creativity and a military environment is 
usually not centered on creativity itself. More often, creativity is in the periphery of 
another construct. For example, in Cognition in the Wild, Hutchins (1995) examined the 
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case of a Navy navigation team onboard the USS Palau. As he learned about the 
relationship between culture and cognition, he also learned how the team, when under 
considerable pressure, innovated and adapted to an emergency situation. 
The narrow focus of military innovation studies makes it difficult to generalize 
their findings to the broader field of creativity and innovation. In a state of the art review 
of military innovation studies, Grissom (2006) suggested that military innovation can be 
defined as “a change in operational praxis that produces a significant increase in military 
effectiveness’ [sic] as measured by battlefield results” (p. 907). This definition is so 
narrow that it might not be useful for our case study. It excludes not only creativity and 
innovation studies outside a military setting, but also military studies where direct effects 
on “battlefield results” cannot be measured. 
While the creativity research drinks from a well of knowledge shared by the fields 
of psychology, neuroscience, organizational behavior, education, management, and so 
forth, the authors of military innovation studies develop their own theories, concepts, and 
underlying factors to explain innovation in historical military cases. For example, Foley 
(2012) deemed it necessary to define innovation as either a horizontal or vertical process. 
Further, Foley made no reference to studies outside the sphere of military strategy to 
support his claims about horizontal innovation. By failing to draw from other fields, 
military innovation researchers risk becoming stove-piped and uncreative. To borrow 
West’s (2002) words, their lack of diversity and knowledge sharing may leave them as 
stagnant ponds rather than sparkling fountains of innovation. 
B. DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT 
Because case studies often collect data with high variance, multiple perspectives 
are required for the subsequent interpretation and validation of the data. Multiple 
perspectives provide strength through triangulation. Consequently, this thesis needs to be 
able to interpret many different respondent views on how creativity and innovation can 
be defined and measured. The existence of multiple views on creativity and innovation 
reminds us about the need for precision in communicating the results. 
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Most of the literature reviewed holds that creativity can be defined as the 
generation of novel and useful ideas, while innovation is the implementation of those 
ideas (e.g., Bledow et al., 2009, p.305). Treating the two terms separately enables the 
discussion of how some factors may behave differently depending on whether their effect 
on creativity or on innovation is measured. For example, West (2002) proposed that 
external demands influence innovation positively and creativity negatively. Creativity has 
also been suggested as the first step and a necessary, but not sufficient, stage for 
innovation (Amabile et al., 1996). This perspective supports the creation of measurement 
scales like Amabile et al.’s KEYS (1996) that measure factors proposed to affect only 
creativity but that are still valid scales for addressing the potential for innovation. 
Nevertheless, treating creativity and innovation as two separate stages does not 
exclude the fact that innovations can be based on ideas from outside the unit of analysis, 
so-called “open innovation” (Søndergaard & Burcharth, 2011), or that successful 
implementation often relies on creative attributions throughout the innovation stage. The 
launch of the Post-it is one of many examples of the latter (West, 2002). The notion that 
creative idea-generating activities go hand-in-hand with innovative idea-pursuing 
activities (exploration vs. exploitation), implies an iterative process more complex than 
the two-stage creativity—innovation process. Process views on innovation (e.g., Cropley 
& Cropley, 2012) have been used to better explain that complexity. Anderson et al. 
(2014), on the other hand, suggested using a definition that includes both creativity and 
innovation in an effort to resolve inconsistency in how researchers approach creativity. 
Although most researchers agree on the novelty and quality definition of 
creativity and the exploration versus exploitation viewpoint, the differentiation between 
creativity and innovation has led to different operationalizations of the terms (Anderson 
et al., 2014). Some choose to differentiate between “big C” (radical, life changing ideas) 
and “small c” (everyday improvements) creativity. Other researchers argue that 
innovation includes incremental improvements whereas creativity can only be something 
completely new. Some assume clear boundaries between innovation and creativity as 
opposed to a cyclic process. The different viewpoints, together with differences in 
context (from school children to Michelangelo) and levels of abstraction (from brain cell 
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to western culture), have resulted in a variety of measurement approaches of varying 
quality (Amabile et al., 1996; Anderson et al., 2014; Batey, 2012). 
Many studies2 still rely on self-ratings, a measurement method that, not 
surprisingly, may be less valid than more objective methods (Sundstrom, McIntyre, 
Halfhill, & Richards, 2000). A majority of researchers use context-specific measurement 
scales (Anderson et al., 2014). Other subjective, but still popular, measurement scales are 
peer-review and expert judgment, both prone to biases (Batey, 2012). If available, expert 
opinions and even quasi-expert opinions are assumed to be useful (Kaufman & Baer, 
2012), but experts often go wrong (e.g., contemporaries’ judgment of van Gogh) and are 
no better at forecasting the future than the rest of us (Kahneman, 2011).  
When assessing five measures for team work climate (hypothesized to greatly 
affect creativity and innovation), Mathisen and Einarsen (2004) found only two to be of 
“acceptable scientific quality”: the TCI and the KEYS measurement scales. Moreover, as 
Runco and Acar (2012) found with measures for divergent thinking, the scales measure 
traits thought to be associated with creativity and innovation, and not creativity and 
innovation per se.  
Objective measures should be less prone to bias and halo effects (DeChurch & 
Mesmer-Magnus, 2010), but they might not provide the whole picture. For instance, the 
much-used Unusual Uses Task (UUT) measures only the novelty and originality of ideas 
while disregarding the quality part of creativity. Baird et al. (2012) used the UUT to 
assess whether creativity is improved by engaging in tasks that maximize mind 
wandering. Incredibly, the researchers could show that by allowing the mind to wander 
participants became more divergent according to the UUT scores. However, when Baird 
et al. equate UUT and creativity they ignore that creative ideas must also be useful and 
purposeful. Paint randomly thrown at a canvas may create a highly unusual and original 
                                                 
2 According to Anderson et al. (2014), 45 % of creativity and innovation studies rely on subjective 
measurements (24% of studies at the individual level, 7% for team level studies, and 14 % of multi-level 
studies). 
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picture, but without being purposefully created to convey a message it is not a creative 
work of art. 
The inconsistency in measurement has been used to discount their validity and to 
justify disregarding their findings. Paulus (2000) presented consistent findings of lowered 
effectiveness for idea generation during group brainstorming sessions, compared to 
results achieved by the summing of individuals’ contributions. Sawyer (2007), however, 
discounted these findings by claiming that they were only true because the type of ideas 
measured in laboratory experiments are overly simplistic compared to real-life design 
challenges where group collaboration is essential. Klijn and Tomic (2010) went so far as 
to “conclude that there is a methodological obstacle to objectively measure creativity” (p. 
336) since the measurements were subjective and situational. They also objected to 
analyses of creativity based on laboratory experiments, arguing that work in a laboratory 
setting necessarily lacked ecological validity. 
Dewett (2007) critiqued researchers’ reliance on subjective measures of creativity 
as the dependent variable and of the independent variables thought to predict creativity. 
His report serves as an illustration of how measurement and definition inconsistencies 
raise obstacles to measuring creativity and innovation objectively. In a study of 
employees of a U.S. research and development (R&D) organization, Dewett used self-
report measures (surveys) of intrinsic motivation and willingness to take risks to predict 
creativity. Creativity was measured by subjective supervisor ratings and objective 
measures such as patents, papers presented, and awards received. In this mixture of 
subjective, objective, self-reported and peer assessments, Dewett was surprised to find 
big differences between the subjective and objective scales. Subjective supervisor ratings 
supported previous findings, using similar scales, on the importance of intrinsic 
motivation to creativity. In contrast, objective measures did not show the same positive 
relationships between intrinsic motivation, risk taking, and creativity. Dewett argued that 
subjective measures may not be a valid measure of creative end products useful to an 
organization, but leaves it to future research to establish valid objective measures. 
Without saying so explicitly, he also left it to future research to establish if the 
inconsistencies he reported can be attributed to a divergent level of analysis. The 
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subjective measures assessed creativity at the employee or individual level, while the 
objective measures can be said to have assessed either creativity, innovation, or just 
productivity at the organizational level. 
The impact of the inconsistencies in measurement is that creativity and innovation 
in a real-world scenario is context dependent and may be difficult to assess objectively. 
The only visible aspects of creativity and innovation may be factors (e.g., team 
knowledge diversity) assumed to be related to either of the terms, as opposed to having 
an objective, quantifiable and context-free scale that provides a direct measure of 
creativity or innovation. This is not to say that we should let ourselves be entrenched by 
the, in our case, military context, and not look to other disciplines for insights. It merely 
implies that we need to approach both the data and our interpretation with sound 
skepticism and caution. The case must be assessed with knowledge of the measurement 
inconsistencies. Furthermore, while this thesis uses the definitions of creativity as the 
generation of novel and useful ideas, and of innovation as their successful 
implementation, their close relationship and dependency signifies the need for 
consistency and preciseness when they are being addressed. 
C. THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES 
The dialectic approach to creativity, together with the related concepts of process 
view and the investment theory, form three of the cornerstones of the theoretical 
framework in the case study. 
1. The Dialectic Approach to Creativity 
New ideas move the society forward, but before they are accepted and 
implemented as current practice, they are fought fiercely. The dialectic approach 
addresses this tension. It implies that conditions and characteristics needed for innovation 
may be seen as contradictory. Familiarity with this view allows us to see beyond those 
contradictions, and instead of becoming bewildered when finding evidence pointing in 
what appears to be different directions, we can keep a steady course towards 
understanding creativity and innovation. 
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There is a paradox in creativity. As outlined in the investment model, the creative 
process introduces new ideas to adjust current knowledge in a thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis model. A creator, team or leader needs to be able to both use his divergent 
thinking skills in generating new, useful ideas, and to use convergent thinking to be able 
to realize and sell the product or idea to an audience still getting by on old, established 
beliefs. Thus, the creative process has a Janus head. Seemingly there are multiple, and at 
times conflicting courses that lead to innovation. This gives rise to the concept of 
creativity as a dialectic process; evidence of the dialectic can be found in creativity 
research on culture, neuroscience, and psychology (Holm-Hadulla, 2013). For example, 
from a psychological point of view, the dialectic is to find a balance between convergent 
and divergent thinking, open-mindedness and sharp focus. There is a need for knowledge 
and intelligence, but not too much knowledge or intelligence (Runco, 2006). There is a 
need for pressure, but not too much pressure, and there is a need for diversity, while 
maintaining unity of effort (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Paulus, 2000). 
In neuroscience, even more signs of the duality have been found. Neuroscientists 
have found that the brain operates in both an externally focused, goal-directed mode, 
solving problems by the use of known patterns, and an exploratory, diffused, default 
network mode where novel connections and spontaneous thoughts are generated 
(Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Although researchers of creativity often show special interest in 
the prefrontal cortex of the brain, i.a., required for cognition, (Runco, 2006), from a 
physiological standpoint, creativity cannot be localized in one particular brain region. 
Certain aspects of creative behavior may activate particular brain regions, but in general, 
during idea generation, dynamic networks combining many different regions are formed 
(R. E. Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013). The entire brain is active when engaged in 
creative problem solving. During the creative process, an increase of new neurological 
connections between various brain regions is observed. The creative process recruits 
resources from different regions of the brain, associating and connecting them in new 
ways to come up with novel solutions (Sawyer, 2011). In innovation, there is an obvious 
need for focused thinking and decision making, yet more creative ideas are formulated 
when an individual is allowed to take his or her focus off the problem for a while, and 
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then later return to the problem. Mind wandering, or incubation, has been found to have a 
positive effect on idea generation (Baird et al., 2012). 
Holm-Hadulla (2013) extended the dialectic model to cultural views on creativity, 
arguing that creativity can be viewed as the classic struggle between order and chaos. 
Creation is to create light from nothing; to find inspiration for an artistic masterpiece in 
the terror and destruction of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War; or, from the 
structured order of quantum physics, to create ultimate destruction. Creativity is the 
ability to see order in chaos, and the ability to deconstruct an orderly system, only to 
rearrange the pieces in a new composition that brings new insight and wisdom. In more 
practical terms, the dialectics of creativity and innovation can be examined with the aim 
of identifying management practices to address tensions resulting from at times 
conflicting demands. With these tensions in mind, Bledow et al. (2009) reviewed 
organizational and management research to come up with principles that support 
innovation management.  
Tensions of innovation exist at the individual, team and organizational levels 
(Bledow et al., 2009). Common sources of tension are: organizational conformity and 
stereotypes versus open-mindedness and change, the need for discussion and challenging 
viewpoints versus streamlined effectiveness, and communication issues between 
exploratory and exploitative activities. Several management strategies have been 
suggested to overcome these tensions. Among them are dialogue and communication, 
separating activities/departments (e.g., Research & Development and Marketing) while 
integrating them at higher levels, diversity and variability integrated by higher level 
leadership, openness to diversity and challenging viewpoints, situation-dependent and 
proactive leadership, and a flexible company vision (Bledow et al., 2009). While these 
approaches are not evidence-based success recipes for management, they can be used to 
identify possible areas of tension, and potential strategies for addressing them.  
When examining the case at hand, the dialectic approach to creativity may help to 
explain seemingly conflicting findings or tensions between goal-directed behavior and 
more exploratory, idea-generating behavior in individual sailors, teams, ship departments, 
the leadership, or the Navy as a whole. 
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a. Process View of Creativity 
The paradox or dilemma of creativity may be easier to grasp when creativity is 
separated from innovation, or when a more detailed process of the movement from idea 
to product is described. West (2002) made the distinction between creativity as idea 
generation on the one hand, and innovation—in which an idea is implemented—on the 
other hand. He suggested different or competing drivers needed in each phase for the idea 
to be both generated and implemented. As an example, external demands or pressure may 
inhibit the creative generation of new ideas, but may serve to encourage and motivate 
idea implementation. West proposed that team innovation is dependent on different 
factors that may compete or have an inverted u-shaped relationship to each other, but 
they all contribute to the overall level of innovation.  
Team diversity is one factor found to contribute differently to the idea generation 
phase and the innovation phase. A diverse team is regarded as instrumental to idea 
generation, but how diverse can the team be before the mental models are no longer 
shared among the members, or before conflict inhibits the process from moving forward? 
Sometimes it might be necessary with military effectiveness, uniformity, and unity of 
effort to get the idea through, but pressure to conform and group thinking may moderate 
the novelty of that idea (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). 
The use of stage models is well established in creativity research. Guilford (1950), 
for instance, described Preparation, Incubation, Inspiration, and Evaluation/Verification. 
Cropley and Cropley (2012) extended the process view to include not only creation and 
innovation, but also Preparation, Activation, Generation, Illumination, Verification, 
Communication, and Validation. These seven phases were constructed to encompass all 
the nuances in creativity and innovation, and thereby address all the tensions described by 
Bledow et al. (2009). By studying the phenomenon in such detail, the dialectics of 
creativity are managed by assigning competing factors, for example, convergent versus 
divergent thinking, to respective phases. Moreover, the four Ps of creativity (Person, 
Process, Press, and Product) can be studied in terms of each phase. An organization’s 
creative potential can be analyzed down to the individual’s needs based on psychological 
factors contained in the four Ps. Nevertheless, a model with such resolution may miss the 
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big picture. Will an organization be able to clearly distinguish between the different 
phases, could they occur simultaneously, and are these phases an accurate description of 
how every organization innovates? 
An innovation process would most likely have to be tailored to its organization. 
The detailed information required for an analysis by Cropley and Cropley’s seven stage 
process may not be easily accessible. The more simplified, general view of creativity and 
innovation as the two only stages of the process may prove to be more useful in this time-
limited case study. Nevertheless, recognizing the existence of separate needs during 
different stages of the process may improve the understanding of the conditions which 
promote or inhibit creativity and innovation. If paradoxes or tensions are found during the 
case study, a process view could be helpful to form a clearer picture of the situation. 
b. Investment Theory 
The investment theory of creativity states that creativity is to make the choice to 
defy old thinking and accept the risk (or cost) of being seen as unconventional 
(Sternberg, 2006). As the third part of the theoretical framework, investment theory 
advocates interpreting the data in light of the risks and challenges that arise when defying 
old thinking. 
The role of creativity is to question and defy common knowledge. As such, 
creative ideas can be understood as the antithesis that questions established beliefs. If 
intelligence is defined as the current modus operandi (i.e., the way in which society is 
currently thinking, the thesis to which we anchor our beliefs), creativity suggests a new 
direction that will eventually result in wisdom (i.e., the synthesis of the old and the new 
knowledge) (Sternberg, 2001). An intelligent suggestion will add quality to a current 
system, but without creativity, the solution will lack novelty; eventually, the system will 
experience stagnation. Hence, both creativity and intelligence are desired. From the point 
of view of investment theory, to advance an idea from its generating to implementing 
stage requires three types of skill: synthetic, analytic, and practical. If the entire 
innovation process is laid in the hands of one individual, he or she would need to be as 
curious and divergent as a multitalented artist, while also being calculating like an 
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engineer, focused like the stereotypical drill sergeant, and persuasive like the most 
talented salesman. These conflicting traits are necessary because creativity is to choose to 
challenge current tradition, and creative individuals and groups must expect their 
initiatives to be attacked by those still rooted in old belief systems. The less radical the 
idea (that is, the closer to current intelligence), the less resistance should be expected.  
An innovation can then occur only if the investment is worth the risk. A low risk 
environment can be created by not letting an organization be entrenched in current 
knowledge, but by lowering the bar for new suggestions and outside knowledge and 
“selling” the idea effectively. Innovators onboard USS Nimitz may have consciously or 
unconsciously used this strategy. 
Investment theory suggests that when interpreting the data from this case study, 
we should consider how radical the idea was perceived by the crewmembers onboard. 
Consequently, it is important to also consider the potential measures that were taken to 
make the idea appear less radical, and to mitigate the perceived risks of its 
implementation. 
2. Factor Theory 
The Factor Theory of creativity is the fourth cornerstone of the theoretical 
framework’s foundation. It emphasizes that factors related to creativity and innovation 
can be found at the individual, team, organizational, and cultural levels. This perspective 
stems from earlier, largely psychometric creativity research aimed at understanding the 
traits and states of the individuals. The research was performed within the framework of 
4 Ps: person, process, press, and product. A significant leap forward was taken when the 
perspective was expanded to include teams, organizations, and cultures (Anderson et al., 
2014). The notion that different factors exist at different levels of abstraction implies that 
(1) it is valuable to examine interactions across levels and (2) creativity and innovation 
may be understood as an emergent property from a system of interacting subsystems of 
organizations, teams, and individuals. Factor theory can benefit the case study by offering 
a view of the ship as consisting of layers of individuals, team, and organizations within 
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an even larger organization. Each layer has unique attributes worthy of separate 
examination. This section investigates each of the four levels in turn. 
a. Individual Factors 
Guilford (1950) understood creativity as a matter of human personality: the 
“pattern of traits that are characteristic of creative persons” (p. 444). In his vision, the aim 
of creativity research should be to identify the traits belonging to creative individuals, and 
subsequently, to design appropriate measures to quantify them. A basis for the selection 
and training of creative individuals can be established once a test can reliably identify 
traits associated with creativity. Torrance (1965) took a similar perspective in 
investigating individual traits associated with creativity and hypothesized promotion of 
the traits by proper education. 
The research approach Guilford and Torrance outlined is centered on an 
individual’s abilities, temperament, and his or her intrinsic motivation to continue 
exploring. The underlying assumption is that creativity is a state that can be improved by 
training and a trait that a few creative geniuses possess in great quantity. The left-hand 
column of Table 1 presents the traits Guilford hypothesized as characterizing creative 
people. 
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Table 1.   Individual Factors of Creativity (data from Guilford, 1950; 
Sternberg, 2006) 
Individual Factors, From Guilford to Sternberg 
Guilford’s traits Sternberg’s resources 
1. Sensitivity to problems 1. Intellectual skills 
2. Ideational fluency 2. Knowledge 
3. Flexibility of set 3. Thinking styles 
4. Ideational novelty 4. Personality 
5. Synthesizing ability 5. Motivation 
6. Analyzing ability 6. Environment 
7. Reorganizing or redefining ability  
8. Span of ideational structure  
9. Evaluating ability  
10. Motivation and Temperament  
 
The human trait perspective enables the measurement, selection, and training of 
creative individuals, but even Guilford’s pilots operated within a squadron. Purely 
focusing on individuals may overlook the larger organization and environment in which 
the individuals operate. Unless our emphasis lay on the “lone creative genius,” the 
research needs to consider a broader perspective. There is perhaps an irony in the way 
that Guilford recognized the importance of promoting creative traits, but did not 
recognize the organizational impediments to creativity designed into the selection process 
he was using.  
More than 50 years later, Guilford’s footprints are still visible in creativity 
research. Scholars have built on, and gradually expanded his mostly psychometric 
foundation. In a later model, Sternberg (2006) maintained the focus on creative 
individuals, but expanded the understanding of the subject by adding environmental 
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factors, and stating how the different elements/traits may influence each other (see Table 
1). As in systems theory, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. For example, 
differences in motivation and environment influence the intellectual skills of personality 
types needed to be judged as creative. 
In reviewing the most recent research on the effect of individual traits and states 
on creativity and innovation, Anderson et al. (2014) did not find a definite answer to the 
earlier research’s (ref. Guilford) quest for defining the “right” individual factors 
promoting creativity. Context, type of innovation, and definition of the subject (e.g., 
creativity vs. innovation) influence the predictive value of the various individual human 
factors measured. “The relation between personality and creativity is complex, which is 
shaped by contextual variables” (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 1303). 
In a quest to find which personality dimension, leadership style, knowledge, and 
abilities an organization like the Navy should consider in order to recruit, retain, and 
promote creative and innovative individuals, the answer might be this: It depends. “In 
other words, this body of work is especially difficult to decipher”—(as Hennessy and 
Amabile [2010, p. 77] expressed it in regard to the relationship between creativity and 
individual differences and personality). Klijn and Tomic (2010) supported the same view. 
With regard to personality dimension, they claimed that “employers who select 
employees for creative behavior based on perceived personality traits have not had much 
success” (p. 329). In terms of divergent versus convergent thinking style, “the most 
appropriate heuristic depends on the type of question or the problem to be solved” (Klijn 
& Tomic, 2010, p. 330). 
One can only conclude that the effect of individual factors seems highly 
dependent on the situation, context and work environment within which the innovation is 
supposed to take place. 
b. Team/Groups 
By expanding the viewpoint to team, group, or organization, we are able to 
address the work environment’s influence on the individual’s creative or innovative 
effort. Amabile et al. (1996) argued that creativity and innovation are a result of 
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individual team members’ intrinsic motivation: “People will be most creative when they 
are primarily intrinsically motivated, by the interest, satisfaction, and challenge of the 
work itself” (p. 1158). Intrinsic motivation—an individual trait—is influenced by team 
factors and/or pressure from the environment.  
Amabile et al. (1996) understood creativity as idea generation, and suggested that 
creative ideas are the foundation for innovative products. To capture their insights about 
the link between intrinsic motivation and creativity, Amabile et al. designed the KEYS 
creativity scale. The scale, Table 2, measures individuals’ perceptions of factors in the 
social work environment. 
In a related effort, Anderson and West (1998) aimed to identify and measure 
factors in the team climate hypothesized to promote innovation. Anderson and West 
considered the implementation of ideas, and took an approach that looked at both the 
traits of the individual and the traits of the group itself. Based on their research, they 
designed the Team Climate Inventory (TCI) to measure factors in the team climate 
suggested to promote innovation. The TCI includes not only the individual in the team, 
but also characteristics of the problem to be solved, the skillset of the team as a whole 
(e.g., collaboration skills and shared knowledge), and group processes.  
Both the KEYS and TCI are commercially available surveys intended to measure 
factors influencing creativity and innovation in a team’s work and social climate. This 
case study—based on open-ended interviews—does not use the surveys directly, but the 
factors the surveys emphasize may surface during the interviews and are important 
indicators of a climate favorable to creativity and innovation. 
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Table 2.   Team Factors (data from Amabile et al., 1996; Anderson & West, 
1998) 




- Encouragement of risk taking and idea generation. 
Valuing innovation from highest to lowest level of 
management. 
- Fair, supportive and non-threatening evaluation of new 
ideas. 
- Reward and recognition of creativity. 
- Collaborative idea flow across the organization. 
participative management and decision making. 
Exposure to other ideas. 
2. Supervisory 
encouragement 
- Goal clarity. Open interaction between supervisors and 
subordinates. Supervisory support. 
3. Work group support - Team diversity, openness, constructive challenging of 
ideas, shared commitment. 
4. Freedom and 
autonomy  
5. Sufficient resources  
6. Challenging work  




- Internal strife, conservatism, rigid and formal 
management. 
TCI  
1. Vision  
2. Participative safety  
3. Task orientation  
4. Support for innovation  
 
The perspectives offered by Amabile et al., (1996) and Anderson and West (1998) 
suggest that both group and individual traits are important to data collection and analysis, 
and that there may be interactions between the two. Both perspectives focus primarily on 
positive conditions for creativity and innovation. A favorable perception of the 
environment suggests that the individual is intrinsically motivated to innovate. Extrinsic 
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motivation is, on the other hand, said to undermine creativity and innovation, as it will, 
most likely, make the individual feel externally controlled. Nevertheless, rewards and 
instructions given under the right conditions have in some instances been found to 
positively impact creativity (Eisenberger & Rhoades, 2001; Eisenberger & Shanock, 
2003; O’Hara & Sternberg, 2001). Similarly, perceived leadership expectancy has been 
shown to increase employees’ creative results (Tierney & Farmer, 2011). 
Paulus (2000) provided additional detail on group processes that undermine 
creativity. He suggested that social inhibitors and cognitive interferers inhibit the creative 
potential of groups. Paulus illustrated a darker side of team processes concerning creative 
productivity that complements the two perspectives focused on intrinsic motivation. 
Table 3.   Inhibitors of Creative Potential in Teams (after Paulus, 2000) 
Inhibitors of Creative Potential in Teams 
Social Inhibitors Cognitive Interferers 
Social anxiety Production blocking 
Social loafing/free riding Task irrelevant behavior  
Illusion of productivity Cognitive load 
Matching and downward comparison  
 
Intrinsic motivation is an outcome of team and organizational behavior 
encouraging creative and innovative effort, i.e., the social environment of the workgroup. 
Almost two decades of research on the social psychology of creativity has led to the 
conclusion that despite the importance of a person’s expertise and creative abilities, it is 
the person’s intrinsic motivation that will have the most significant effect on creativity. In 
promoting creativity and innovation, this inner drive and curiosity is the factor that 
organizations can benefit the most from promoting, or, conversely, that they can lose by 
inhibiting (Amabile, 1998; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010). Therefore, factors regarding 
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intrinsic motivation are important to support the interviews held during the case study, 
and their subsequent analysis. 
Creativity and the subsequent innovation can be seen as the sum of the positive 
effect of intrinsic motivation and the negative effect of pressure from extrinsic motivation 
as it is perceived by the individual. This thesis relies on the power of open-ended 
interviews to capture the individual sailor’s perception of the motivating factors in his or 
her team climate.  
Factors in a team’s work climate, such as those measured by KEYS, were 
assumed to be a valid measure for organizations as well (Amabile et al., 1996). Similarly, 
Jung et al. (2008) found climate for innovation to be positively related to organizational 
innovation. Still, as the next section shows, when assessing a whole organization, there 
are more aspects to consider. 
c. Organization/Culture 
To understand the drivers and inhibitors of creativity, one may also choose to look 
at the environment at a macro level. Seitz (2003) included not only the individual’s 
abilities, and work-domain, but also the social, institutional, and political forces that 
influence the process. Forces like corporate control, censorship, monopoly, economic 
interests, conformism, copyright, and protection of intellectual property may all inhibit 
creativity. The industries of Silicon Valley are prime examples of creative 
entrepreneurship. Seitz argued that in this environment ideas are exchanged freely in 
wide social networks. Bureaucracy and corporate hierarchies are kept as low as possible. 
The industries thrive in a social climate where cooperation and collaboration are common 
practice. They avoid the pitfalls of being entrenched in old thinking and tradition by 
engaging in a domain that is still open to new ideas and inventions. Furthermore, creative 
ideas from Silicon Valley inventors benefit from an ecosystem of risk-tolerant investors, 
nearby top universities, supportive infrastructure, and leading IT businesses. Both social 
and institutional/political structures are in place to promote innovation. With a sample of 
50 Taiwanese electronic and telecommunications companies, Jung et al. (2008) found 
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similar traits to be positively related to innovation: namely, low formalization, low 
centralization, competition and a sense of urgency to get new ideas to the market. 
Leaders of such organizations must facilitate communication, collaboration and 
knowledge sharing (Sawyer, 2007). Their leadership style should be characterized by 
their charisma, idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and 
individual consideration: a transformational leadership style (Jung et al., 2008). Al 
though context-dependent, leadership behavior stimulates creative behavior (Anderson et 
al., 2014), and even perceived management support for innovation enhances creative 
climate scores (Isaksen & Akkermans, 2011). Leader qualities are essential to military 
organizations and the interviews with the leadership onboard the Nimitz are essential 
parts of this study. 
Amabile et al. (1996) held that transactional leadership which defends the status 
quo and motivates through contractual agreements, is detrimental for creativity. This 
view is contrasted with transformational leadership which is thought to enhance both 
creativity and innovation “by encouraging followers to think ‘out of the box’ and to adopt 
generative and exploratory ideas and solutions” (Jung et al., 2008, p. 584). When testing 
this hypothesis, Jung et al. found evidence to support the claim that transformational 
CEO leadership is positively related to organizational innovation. CEOs with a more 
liberal attitude towards change are associated with more innovative organizations, while 
conservative CEOs are associated with corporations that emphasize quality over novelty 
(Musteen, Barker III, & Baeten, 2010). However, top management’s effect on innovation 
is moderated by the socio-cultural context within which the leadership is performed 
(Elenkov & Manev, 2005). When national, socio-cultural differences are taken into 
account, there is no consensus about the impact of leadership style on organizational 
innovation, whether the leadership is transformational, transactional or corrective-
avoidant. Leaders must manage conflicting demands (Bledow et al., 2009). Behavior that 
stimulates idea generation might not stimulate the same idea’s implementation. To be 
innovative, organizations must pursue both the idea generating and implementing path. A 
dialectic approach may be the answer. Bledow et al. argued for the need for situation-
dependent, proactive leadership that can overcome the tensions between conflicting 
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demands of creativity and innovation. An understanding of the cultural context needs to 
be added to that argument.  
D. BATEY’S MODEL OF CREATIVITY 
In an extensive review of creativity research, Batey (2012) suggested a 
comprehensive model to understand creativity (See Figure 1). Batey proposed that 
creativity could be understood by three dimensions. First, he observed that historically, 
the novelty and quality definition of creativity has been used when assessing the areas of 
Person, Process, Press, and Product: the four Ps of creativity. Secondly, there is the level 
at which creativity had been measured, and third, there was the approach taken to 
measure it. Creativity studies, he argued, typically measure a variable represented by an 
intersection of the three axes, such as self-rating of an individual’s trait. 
The model (see Figure 1) was illustrated by a three-dimensional cube where 
Level, Facet and Measurement Approach were represented by the x, y, or z axis. The x-
axis represented the 4 Ps of creativity where “Person” was reworded to “Trait” to comply 
better with studies that used a level of analysis above the individual. Level, which were 
individual, team, organization, and culture, formed the y-axis. Finally, the z-axis 
represented the different measurement approaches creativity studies would take. 
Batey presented the model as a heuristic to understand creativity research. It is 
heuristic because it may not be completely accurate, some factors may fit in more than 
one place of the model, and creativity may exist somewhere between the factors 
measured. The measured factor is only a construct related to creativity, not creativity 
itself. Creativity may be seen as the product of all the intersections in the model. This last 
point resonates with Hennessey and Amabile’s (2010) conclusion that to understand 
creativity, a systems view must be taken. Factors found at all levels of abstraction 
contribute to the overall picture, and their combined effects and interactions are what 
ultimately shape the emergent properties of creativity and innovation (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010). 
Batey’s model brings the thesis’ interpretive framework together. In this thesis, 
his model has been adapted to include the theories that were used for the case study 
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(Figure 2). Factor theory stands out as the most visible part of the model. In line with 
factor theory, Batey expanded the understanding of creativity to include not only 
individuals, but also teams, organizations, and even whole cultures. The dialectic 
approach, the process view, and the investment theory come into play as soon as we go 
below its surface, when we need an understanding of the data that goes beyond 
describing the presence of a factor at a certain level of abstraction. To illustrate, Holm-
Hadulla (2013) made it clear that, dialectic tensions may exist at any level of abstraction, 
from culture to individual. At those levels, tensions may occur between for instance 
desired traits (e.g., divergent vs. convergent thinking skills) or different types of press 
(e.g., intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation). Similarly, the investment theory may help in 
explaining why a certain trait was helpful to an individual during the innovation process, 
or why leadership encouragement (press) helped a team to advance their creative ideas 
into innovative products. 
 
 
Figure 2.  A theoretical framework based on Batey (2012) 
 
Armed with clear definitions of creativity and innovation, this model was used as 
a rule of thumb to explore the case study. It represented a readily available anchor rooted 
in theories of creativity and innovation. Batey chose to illustrate the model as a cube. 
This cube can be held over the case as a loupe, and by adjusting the angle, different 
aspects of the case become visible. Can an incident from the case be understood as a 
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result of an individual trait, or, from another perspective, an organizational process? And 
are there signs of a dialectic process regarding that individual trait? By turning also to the 
measurement approach, are there reasons for being critical of the validity of what we 
measure? 
E. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this chapter, I presented the SECNAV’s call for creativity and 
innovation, and asked if we actually understand the meaning of those words. With the 
perspectives offered by creativity research and a model with which to assess creativity 
and innovation, we are closer to that understanding. We know the conditions others have 
looked for in assessing creativity and innovation, and have a common language to discuss 
their findings. 
The perspectives offered by military innovation studies are unique and interesting. 
This review is by no means an attempt to downplay their role, but instead strives to link 
cases of military innovation to a richer source of research. Bringing creativity research 
and military innovation together will provide more angles of approach and subsequently, 
a better understanding of the data from cases of military innovation. The framework of 
theories and perspectives offered in this chapter contributes to a more focused data 
collection and interpretation, more precise communication of the results and, eventually, 
an enhanced comprehension of the case of military innovation we are about to analyze. 
Table 4 summarizes the theories and perspectives behind the theoretical 
framework by listing each theory together with an illustrative quote. The quotes are 
intended as a demonstration of how that particular perspective may surface during the 
interviews. The quotes put together illustrate how a too narrowly focused theoretical 
framework may miss valuable insights that are likely to appear during open-ended 
interviews on a case of creativity and innovation. 
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Table 4.   Summary Table 
Summary table of theories and perspectives in the theoretical framework 
Definition and measurement 
“They had so many brilliant ideas; too bad none of them were implemented.” 
“Do you think it is an innovation?” “Of course, our performance increased by 50%.” 
“It wasn’t very creative. I heard that idea had been tried before.” 
 
Dialectic approach 
“I want my crew to take the time to think and come up with new ideas.” “I want 
dedicated, focused and hardworking sailors!” 
“She always sees things with a fresh perspective. It’s good to have her on the team, but 
sometimes we just need to move forward.” 




“At first we were brainstorming and throwing ideas around, later the CO decided on a 
plan, and we set to work.” 
“Some very creative ideas came up as we were implementing the project.” 
“It felt like we were going back to idea generation.” 
 
Investment theory 
“It was a good suggestion, but we have always done it the way we do. There is no need 
for improvement.” 
“I had to work hard to win them over.” 
“It was an unpopular initiative at first, but when we got used to it, it made a lot of sense.” 
 
Individual Factors 
“He has got this amazing ability to come up with crazy ideas no one else has considered.” 
“I’m very passionate about this; I really want to find a solution.” 
“If it wasn’t for Jones’ expert knowledge, we would never have thought about that.” 
 
Team/Groups 
“We had a clear vision of what we wanted to achieve.” 
“Everyone that was working on the project had similar background and experience.” 
“We lacked the resources to do this.” 
 
Organization/Culture 
“The XO made it clear that we had to follow procedure.” 
“In our department we always go by the chain-of-command.” 
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III. ON CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
A case study is “an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the 
cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a population of 
cases)” (Gerring, 2007, p. 37). For example, a study of a single ship can shed light on a 
navy. Every case study revolves around a bounded phenomenon to capture its inherent 
complexity and uniqueness, just as this particular case study revolves around creativity 
and innovation within the boundaries formed by the hull of the USS Nimitz. Setting the 
boundaries allows the case study to go deeper and in greater detail, and sets it apart from 
the broad sampling of correlation research. 
Case studies should be familiar terrain for HSI practitioners. HSI is a field that 
recognizes the value of individual differences in human factors, the complexity of people 
interacting in the real world, and the insights that can be gained from the study of a single 
occurrence like an accident or a defense acquisition program. Here, the case study 
methodology is used in a descriptive manner to refine the understanding of conditions 
allowing for creativity and innovation on board U.S. Navy ships.  
The case study methodology can also be used to generate and explore research 
questions or hypotheses, or to explain or illustrate established theory (Yin, 2009). 
Compared to correlational research, the methodology is also powerful in its ability to 
capture variability, handle a heterogeneous population, investigate rare instances, and 
identify causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Validity is gained 
by the triangulation of data collected from multiple sources, and careful selection of a 
strong and relevant case (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 1995). This chapter discusses each of 
those points in turn, and shows why the case study methodology is appropriate and 
necessary for the research questions posed. 
A. THE ROLE OF CASE STUDIES IN HSI 
Case studies play an important role in HSI. In fact, the very first sources of 
information that Booher (2003)—in the Handbook of HSI—turns to for an explanation of 
the importance of HSI were the case of Three Mile Island and the case of the USS 
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Vincennes. The use of the cases demonstrates the explanatory power of such, fortunately, 
rare incidents. Their complexity and rarity make them unsuitable for large-sample-size 
cross-case analysis or a laboratory experiment. However, insights gleaned from case 
studies of these accidents can further advance the field of HSI. 
To revisit Cognition in the Wild, in analyzing human behavior, “It is notoriously 
difficult to generalize laboratory findings to real-world situations” (Hutchins, 1995, p. 
xiii). If we are to study what Hutchins referred to as naturally situated cognition, the 
context cannot be ignored. A socio-technical system is embedded in a unique and 
dynamic environment. Consequently, the method of studying such systems should be 
able to capture that complexity. The reductionism inherent in traditional experiments 
considering a large population of cases might lead us to “eliminate the very phenomenon 
of interest in the process of simplification” (Hoffman & Woods, 2000, p. 1). The 
“complex conglomerate of interdependent variables” from socio-technical systems 
studied in their context is not easily reduced to comprehensible interaction models 
(Hoffman & Woods, 2000). 
The human factors domain also emphasizes the need to study individuality and 
complexity before generalization: “As a result, in human factors we are faced with the 
problems of trying to arrive at generalizations about organisms whose structures are only 
approximately delineated and whose mechanisms are imperfectly understood” (Chapanis, 
1996, p. 144). Even in the easily measureable field of anthropometry, there is no 
“average” person. When more than two measures of bodily dimensions are taken, the 
variance is too widely distributed for the average value to be useful (Chapanis, 1996). 
Accordingly, cases must be examined on an individual basis. 
Hutchins (1995) demonstrated how an observation-based case study is able to 
capture the complexity of the Navy as an organization, the interactions among the 
navigation team, and an unexpected emergency situation. This is the power of case 
studies and fieldwork in the domain of human factors. In the study of human cognition 
and workplace collaboration (also known as cognitive task analysis [CTA]), fieldwork 
and case studies based on document analysis followed by field observations, interviews 
and critical incident analysis are the researcher’s method of choice (Clancey, 2006; 
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Committee on Human-System Design Support for Changing Technology, Mavor, & Pew, 
2007; Hoffman & Lintern, 2006; Hoffman & Woods, 2000). CTA acknowledges the need 
to move away from artificially constructed laboratory situations with students as research 
subjects, and instead study domain experts in real-world settings (Hoffman & Lintern, 
2006). According to Clancey (2006), “Thus, a study of a work practice is actually a study 
of a setting; this context makes the observed behavior understandable” (p. 129), or 
according to Hutchins (1995), “Human cognition is always situated in a complex 
sociocultural world and cannot be unaffected by it” (p. xiii). 
In the safety domain, case studies of single accidents are a natural foundation for 
insight and learning. For example, resilience engineering has been proposed to take the 
safety domain forward from its predominantly linear cause–effect view of accidents and 
mishaps (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). In a review article on resilience 
engineering, Madni and Jackson (2009) cited case studies of 13 mishaps and accidents3 
to explain concepts of resilience engineering theory. The concepts were used to build a 
framework of resilience engineering. According to the authors, the study of cases is key 
to developing design methods to engineer more resilient systems. That is, to “enhance the 
ability of organizations to explicitly monitor risks, and to make appropriate tradeoffs 
between safety levels and production and economic pressures” (Madni & Jackson, 2009, 
p. 181). “Analysis of past accidents … and case studies point to the need to explicitly 
manage risk continuously and throughout the system life cycle” (Madni & Jackson, 2009, 
p. 186). 
B. PRACTICAL USE OF CASE STUDY METHODS IN AN HSI SETTING 
HSI requires an understanding of the unique characteristics of the user/operator, 
situation, environment, and systems. Generalizable studies across systems or cases, or 
context-independent experiments do not provide precise enough answers: “Note, too, that 
                                                 
3 The 2003 Columbia space shuttle disaster, the 1996 TWA Flight 800 aircraft accident, the 2001 9-11 
attacks on the World trade center, the 2005 New Orleans flooding after Hurricane Katrina, the 1900 
Galveston Hurricane, the 2000 Concorde aircraft accident, the 1969 Apollo 11 landing craft near mishap, 
the 2007 F-22 software failure, the 1994 Nagoya aircraft accident, the 1986 Challenger space shuttle 
disaster, the 1970 Apollo 13 mishap, the 1999 Mars Climate Orbiter mishaps, and the 1940 Tacoma 
Narrows bridge collapse. 
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generalizations will not suffice. What is required is specific and dependable answers” 
(Chapanis, 1996, p. 80). 
In the HSI literature, some guidelines on the practical use of case study methods 
are given. They coincide with more general applications of case studies, and also guide 
the approach of the case study in this thesis. When discussing methods to assess human 
factors, Chapanis calls for the use of applied research with the objective of matching the 
problem to the operational situation, specific population, tasks and methods. The aim is to 
apply theory to real-world problems. Information gathering is done by interviews, 
observations, accident investigations, critical incident studies, activity logs, and 
scenario/environment descriptions. Also outside the HSI realm, interviews, observations, 
context descriptions, and document reviews are all essential case study methods designed 
to capture the complexity of a single case while paying attention to its context (Stake, 
1995). 
In HSI, as in general case study research, the interviews and observations are 
typically open-ended, and to compensate for the relative small number of samples, the 
most representative samples are investigated. Sampling is done by purposeful selection 
according to requirements generated by theory and from project objectives. Snowball 
sampling can be used to improve the representativeness of samples based largely on 
availability and convenience (Committee on Human-System Design Support for 
Changing Technology et al., 2007). In snowball sampling, the interview subject is asked 
to refer the interviewer to another participant who in turn refers the interviewer to yet 
another participant. The snowball steadily grows larger while ensuring representative 
samples. 
Note the practical approach Chapanis (1996) takes. The research is used to make 
predictions about human-system performance, not to develop or evolve human factors 
theory. As a research method in general, case studies are used in a holistic, exploratory 
manner and are also used to develop and evolve theory (Yin, 2003). HSI can also benefit 
from the less “results-oriented” holistic nature of case study methods. Ethnographic 
principles and field work in HSI are used as flexible instruments to holistically explore a 
context or problem by examining in-depth a limited number of cases in a natural setting. 
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This approach is in contrast to less flexible quantitative, experiments in laboratory 
settings where variables are few and controlled. Engineers preferring a reductionist 
summary may feel challenged when trying to generalize from the ethnography’s richness 
in detail (Committee on Human-System Design Support for Changing Technology et al., 
2007). Case study researchers’ answer to that challenge is to use a theoretical framework 
to support their observations (Yin, 2003, 2004). 
Herein, theories from creativity research are applied to the need for innovations in 
the Navy as exemplified by the USS Nimitz. The use of theory makes the findings 
accessible and therefore relevant to other cases as well. Data were gathered primarily 
through unstructured, one-on-one interviews4 with a selection of key personnel onboard 
the Nimitz. To ensure that the sample was representative, the snowball recruiting method 
was used. The participants included the ship’s leadership, a sample of experienced petty 
officers from one particular ship division, and participants and facilitators of an 
innovation project initiated onboard (the Athena Project). Reports from previous NPS 
research on the Nimitz and observations made during that research provided valuable 
background and context descriptions, which are supported by two personal visits to the 
ship and 18 years of professional naval background. 
C. TYPES OF CASE STUDIES 
1. Descriptive 
Case studies can be conducted in either an exploratory, explanatory, or descriptive 
manner (Yin, 2003). In this study, theories of creativity research are used as a framework 
to describe military innovation as it happened onboard the Nimitz. Following a 
descriptive case study methodology, the theory is used not so much to hypothesize about 
cause-effect relationships, but to scope the thesis, guide the data collection, and to present 
and describe the results in a manner relevant for the field of creativity research. Theory 
plays a critical role in a descriptive study. Without the theory, the case cannot be 
                                                 
4 The data from the interviews are stored at the Naval Postgraduate School and can be obtained by 
contacting the Principal Investigator Dr. Nita L. Shattuck. 
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described in a logical, comprehensible manner. In a descriptive case study, theory is used 
to form an ideal model of reality. This model is then used as a lens to view and describe 
the case. The result is a case analyzed by established theories and frameworks, and 
insights that aid and broaden the understanding of both the theory and the case itself. 
Few previous case studies of military innovation have adopted the theories of 
creativity research to describe the forces driving innovation. Consequently, the studies’ 
relevance to the field of creativity research is fading. 
2. Explanatory 
In an explanatory case study, theory also plays a prominent role by being the 
foundation upon which the researcher builds a framework to guide data collection and 
generalize from the findings. In an explanatory case study, the case is used to illustrate a 
theory. Extensive data extracted from the case is used to support or test the complexity of 
the theory. 
Madni and Jackson (2009) used case studies of accidents to illustrate and explain 
the concepts of resilience engineering. A more renowned example of an explanatory case 
study is the discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis by Allison and Zelikow (1999). The 
authors use the crisis to explain three different decision-making theories: the rational 
actor model, the organizational process model, and the governmental politics model. 
Different aspects of the events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrate the 
relevance of the three theories to the study of international politics. The innovative twist 
of that particular case study is that the three theories are in turn used to help explain why 
certain decisions were made during those very important days in modern history. This 
turn from an explanatory approach to a more descriptive one illustrates how case studies 
seldom reside solely within the boundaries of one of the three types of approaches, but 
are flexible enough to borrow from all three. 
3. Exploratory 
Exploratory case studies are designed to explore aspects of a case in preparation 
for a subsequent study. The objective of a case study, to learn more about a situation, 
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causes continuous revelation of important factors that inform and refine the premise of 
the study. It is not given that the mechanisms behind the phenomenon under investigation 
are so evident at the outset of the study that the research question can be fully defined 
upfront. The pilot study should, however, be followed by a separate study with a research 
design based on the findings from the pilot. The exploratory case study is not always 
published, but the need for such studies illustrates the cyclic relationship and the 
feedback loop between insights gained during the course of the study and the design of 
the study itself. The exploratory nature also demonstrates the importance of using flexible 
data collection methods such as open-ended interviews and observations instead of 
prefabricated surveys. 
A renowned example of an exploratory case study is that of Middletown (as 
rendered by Yin [2004]). Its objective was to study the life of an average American town 
during the course of a generation. The researchers did not enter the town with 
expectations of possible findings, or with a clear conception of what (and how) they 
needed to measure. They wanted to record an observed phenomenon rather than to prove 
a thesis. Their findings inspired a later revisit, and, based on the study’s seminal status in 
social science, numerous other related studies as well. 
D. STRENGTHS/CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
Field studies are often attacked by advocates of laboratory experiments. The study 
of a single case is said to be too specialized to add anything useful to the general body of 
knowledge (Hoffman & Woods, 2000). Likewise, the case study methodology in general 
is criticized for being purely qualitative when quantitative data are needed to construct 
generalizable prediction models (Gerring, 2007; Stake, 1995). The divide between purely 
applied research and clean, controllable experiments is, however, artificial. The case 
study methodology does not rule out the use of quantitative data. Any available data or 
information that can help build the case will be used. Consider the famous case study of 
Middletown. The wealth of information gathered both in selecting a representative town 
and in analyzing its inhabitants and context originated from not only observations and 
interviews, but also from statistical data and surveys (Yin, 2004). Similarly, whenever 
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possible, fieldwork includes the scientific principles of control, falsification, 
randomization and models to support the arguments (Gerring, 2007; Hoffman & Woods, 
2000). 
Still, the two research approaches—qualitative and quantitative—have different 
properties that must be considered when choosing the research design. Table 5 lists 
attributes most commonly related to case study research. The table is meant to 
demonstrate the tradeoffs a researcher must consider when choosing an appropriate 
research design. The table indicates where the case study method is typically strong, 
namely, because of its exploratory nature and consideration of multiple variables, in 
generating hypotheses. Testing a hypothesis, on the other hand, is often easier in 
repeatable and controllable laboratory conditions with few variables and little contextual 
influence, that is, if the context-deprived laboratory environment can be said to be 
representative enough of the real-world phenomenon.  
Table 5.   Case Study and Cross-Case Research Designs: Considerations 
(adapted from Gerring, 2007, p. 38) 
 Affinity 
 Case Study Cross-Case Experimental Study 
Research goals   
1. Hypothesis Generating Testing 
2. Validity Internal External 
3. Causal Insight Mechanisms Effects 
4. Scope of Proposition Deep Broad 
Empirical factors   
5. Population of cases Heterogeneous Homogeneous 
6. Causal strength Strong Weak 
7. Useful variation Rare Common 
8. Data availability Concentrated Dispersed 
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In this thesis, Gerring’s (2007) research design considerations were used to 
support the decision to adopt a case study methodology rather than a cross-case 
methodology. Most important for that decision was that the thesis topic required using a 
research design that could address both complexity and richness in detail. The ability to 
have a deep scope, to address a heterogeneous population, and to examine a rare incident 
was preferred to an experimental cross-case design. The decision to adopt a case study 
approach was reinforced by relative weakness of cross-case designs at addressing 
situations where causal effects are difficult to identify and measure. Furthermore, when 
the research design was determined, internal validity became an important property. The 
following discussion provides more detail on the logic behind those decisions. 
1. A Deep Scope and a Heterogeneous Population 
A case study is used when there is a desire for a deep understanding of a question 
and the context of the selected case is given priority. Experimental analysis across cases 
typically provides a broad scope and generalization. In a case study, richness of detail and 
the ability to explain the sources of the variability are preferred to generalization. This 
tradeoff is made with the realization that the case population is heterogeneous. The study 
reported here was designed to capture individual differences by focusing on one instance 
of innovation rather than merging several different instances. The grey-painted ships of 
the Navy are not a homogeneous grey mass, and neither are their crews. They are 
individuals with unique characteristics and personalities that interact within a unique 
context. A case study is able to treat them as individuals. 
2. A Rare Incident 
When there are few available instances of a phenomenon, a case study is the 
preferred option. Unfortunately, creativity and innovation in the Navy are still one of 
those rarely documented events. Once a larger number of documented cases of 
innovation in the Navy becomes available, cross-case analysis will become more 
appropriate. This single case on the Nimitz provides one piece of the puzzle that might 
later lead to insights about the bigger picture. 
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3. Causal Insights 
Studies of creativity and innovation in the Navy are rare and the data are complex. 
The data do not meet the assumptions of traditional experimentally-based hypothesis 
testing, and require case study methodology. Measuring causal effects is the strength of a 
quantitative study. Cross-case correlation research calculates the effect of different 
factors on a dependent variable, y = a + bx. Implicit in such a method is the assumption 
or knowledge of a causal relationship between y, a, and b. In contrast, identification of 
these causal mechanisms is a case study’s power. Considerable research has been 
conducted on the mechanisms behind creativity, but there are still conflicting findings, 
the holistic systems view indicates complex interactions, and few studies have been 
performed in a military setting. Consequently, causal effects were not readily identifiable 
at the beginning of this study. The case study methodology was therefore assessed to be 
better suited to investigate creativity and innovation in the Navy than purely quantitative 
research methods. 
4. Internal Validity 
To provide relevant information about how innovation occurs in the Navy, it is 
important that the case study is strong in terms of internal validity. It must be able to 
provide a valid and credible description of the case in question. Identifying and 
interviewing key personnel on board was therefore essential. Personal interviews were 
able to capture the participants’ individual stories. Their knowledge, background, and 
experience made this case study a trustworthy account of an instance of innovation in the 
Navy. In contrast, quantitative analysis of a survey of a broad, diverse population would 
likely average out much of the expected uniqueness. 
E. CASE SELECTION 
Once this analysis found that a case study is the preferred analysis method, it 
became important to identify a strong, representative case. A good case is one that 
provides opportunities for learning. Learning can happen only if the case catches the 
reader’s interest (Stake, 1995). Table 6 shows the most common methods for case 
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selection. Apart from the two pragmatic aspects, a case that contains one or more of the 
characteristics in Table 6 should be able to catch interest and promote learning.  
The decision to make USS Nimitz the unit of analysis was guided by the methods 
in Table 6, the desire for learning, and the more pragmatic reasons of case accessibility 
and data availability. The case selected in this thesis provides opportunities for learning 
because it is 
• Typical: The Nimitz’s organization, training, tactics and procedures follow the 
same standards as all the ships of the U.S. Navy. It is representative of a Navy 
ship. 
• Diverse: The complexity and size of the organization onboard suggest that it is a 
case that may be able to capture a high degree of variance. 
• Extreme and deviant: The nature of a nuclear aircraft carrier may be seen as 
extreme and unusual compared to studies of creativity and innovation in civilian 
organizations. 
• Crucial: The nature of a naval organization points toward the likelihood of the 
case to exhibit properties (e.g., hierarchy and bureaucracy) assumed to be 
crucial to creativity and innovation. 
• Important: The SECNAV underlined the importance of creativity and innovation 
to the Navy. USS Nimitz being the first of class, and nuclear carriers’ general 
strategic importance indicate that this is an important case to examine 
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Table 6.   Methods for Case Selection 
Methods for case selection 
Methods for representativeness 
(Gerring, 2007) Other methods 
Typical Data availability 









F. DATA COLLECTION 
A study of a real-world phenomenon (e.g., observations of the sun) can result in 
fundamental rejections of the most established scientific models (e.g., the geocentric 
worldview). Historically, it has proven more difficult to change established beliefs by 
referring to a phenomenon that is not easily observed in laboratory conditions or 
explained by formulae with only a few variables. To make a convincing argument, the 
data must be as robust as possible. Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and others used (literally) 
triangulation of data from several sources, gathered over centuries, to build their 
arguments. 
Similarly, a case study gets its strength from the triangulation of data (Gerring, 
2007; Stake, 1995). Triangulation compensates for the small sample size inherent in a 
case study. Like a navigator constructs an accurate position fix from at least three 
intersecting lines of positions, a case study researcher establishes his or her position from 
the triangulation of different perspectives. 
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The primary method of data collection for this thesis was 11 open-ended 
interviews conducted in person, on Skype, and over the phone. Three distinct 
personas/archetypes emerged from the interviews: the Leader, the Petty Officer, and the 
Athena Sailor. The three personas saw the organization and interpreted creativity and 
innovation from very different points of view. Drawing the lines of position from these 
viewpoints provides our primary position fix. Nonetheless, for this triangulation to be a 
good position fix, it must take its bearings from reliable sources. The data points must be 
relevant to the case. In this case study, a snowball sampling technique was used to ensure 
relevant samples of participants.  
Another strong position fix for this study is theory triangulation. Theory 
triangulation applies multiple, and sometimes even competing, theories to support and 
interpret the data (Stake, 1995). The different theories on creativity and innovation 
provide multiple viewpoints that strengthen the interpretation of the data from the case. 
Further triangulation was possible by having access to both researchers and their 
reports from previous NPS research onboard the same ship. This provided valuable 
perspectives about the context. Context descriptions were further augmented by site visits 
and my own naval background. 
G. CLOSING 
This chapter has argued that the case study methodology is appropriate for the 
analysis of creativity and innovation in the Navy because of its ability to capture the 
complexity and uniqueness of human behavior in a real-world context. The rarity and 
heterogeneity of such a study in a naval context further strengthen the rationale for 
choosing a case study research design. This thesis is concerned with the case of USS 
Nimitz. The thesis uses a descriptive approach to understand creativity and innovation 
onboard that particular ship. Theory drives the collection and interpretation of data about 
the case. Triangulation is used to strengthen the data.  
USS Nimitz is a representative case both within the Navy and within studies of 
creativity and innovation, and should be able to capture the interest of the readers and 
provide opportunities for learning. 
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IV. THE USS NIMITZ 
There are about 3,000 sailors on board the Nimitz, and probably tenfold the 
number of stories of innovation. This is one of them. It does not capture every individual 
story, nor even a weighted average. It offers, however, a perspective on how innovation 
can be achieved on board one ship in the U.S. Navy. As such, it contributes to the body of 
knowledge concerning the conditions for creativity and innovation in the military. 
Creativity and innovation can only be understood within its context. This case 
study is discussed against a backdrop of the big Navy, the ship itself, and the events 
surrounding the change of the watch schedule. The case study sought to gather personal 
perspectives and stories as they were recounted by the crew. Three groups with different 
backgrounds and points of view stood out from the interviews. They are presented as 
three personas with supporting but unique perspectives of the situation. 
This chapter is based on evidence collected through interviews, observations, and 
secondary sources such as document analysis and presentations. The personal stories 
gathered through interviews were the primary source of evidence, while observations and 
secondary sources were valuable in supporting the context and background descriptions.  
A. CONTEXT 
1. The Navy 
The Navy needs innovations to keep up with an uncertain environment. It is 
constantly challenged by an uncertain strategic, political, economic, and technological 
environment. Fortunately for Navy innovation, the Navy is characterized by its highly 
trained, knowledgeable, and dedicated officers and enlisted personnel who are motivated 
by strong tradition, corps de esprit, and culture. With approximately 325,000 personnel 
on active duty, there should be a myriad of ideas out there in the fleet ready for harvest. 
Unfortunately, the Navy is an organization that struggles between forces that defy change 
and its need for innovation. It is a large, governmental organization; it can be 
characterized as hierarchic, complex, procedural, bureaucratic, uniform, traditional, risk 
adverse, and inflexible.  
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Unless faced with the possibility of loss, most humans prefer to be careful, avoid 
risk, and defend their status quo (Kahneman, 2011). The Navy as an organization behaves 
similarly. It is an organization that prefers the present situation to an unknown future: In 
the words of Retired U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal (2015) “The problem with 
changing a well performing organization is that they (the people within the organization) 
are ok where they are.” McChrystal (2015) described a military organization that defied 
change because of tradition, habit, personal pride, and ambition. During operations, the 
complexity and size of the military organization was such that it became a challenge to 
understand the big picture and to get everyone onboard. McChrystal further explained 
how a centralized military organization has difficulties in keeping up with the pace of 
change. The traditional military organization assumes that wisdom sits at the top of the 
hierarchy and from there can issue detailed instructions. This illusion of seeing the big 
picture is reinforced by modern technology. To be able to implement change fast enough 
to compete with modern adversaries, McChrystal wanted a military that empowers its 
personnel to make decisions at a local level. A compelling illustration of the complexity 
and centralization of the Navy—and the effect this can have on the intrinsic motivation of 
a sailor—came up during the interviews: 
However … I fear, as the Navy becomes more digitalized, control of 
digitization … from manpower management, to leave management, to 
everything that I do on board, is now slowly completely controlled by 
electronic computer database. Which is fine. Except because it does 
increase efficiency, reduce paper work load, but what I notice in the two 
major programs that I deal with and that have completely rendered me 
powerless in many situations to do my job effectively and to do my job 
better, is the centralization of computer program management systems 
Navy wide.  
Specifically I work with a program called SAMS which is an acronym for 
an acronym of an acronym, which to me I think epitomizes the Navy. It 
stands for SNAP automated medical systems; SNAP stands for ship board 
non tactical ADP program; and ADP stands for automated data 
processing. So that’s SAMS. SAMS is a medical program.  
But I do, I work within a subset of that, a module for radiation health, 
that’s all I do. That’s my bread and butter. And I encounter, from a lean 6 
Sigma perspective, your brain would explode from the inefficiencies of 
trying to do … something as simple as checking someone into or out of 
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this program. I have to enter in, so to enter in a person in the program, I 
have to type in their name, probably 10 or 15 times to query search, recall 
and input over and over again.  
I could spend this entire Skype phone call going over the myriad of 
problems both technical and streamline and inefficiencies and everything. 
And I have let SPAWAR, the owner of this program, let [it] know through 
trouble tickets and countless teleconferences, and hours spent going back 
and forth, and up loading, and walking through with issues, and the whole 
cost of the problem is that this program is so centralized and we do not 
have the authority and ability to modify and/or fix it or even use a 
replacement that we are handcuffed and restricted by the imposition of 
ineffective software. And it’s such a bloated … bureaucracy that changes 
slow, [and even though] changes [are] effective most of the time … a lot 
of my counterparts don’t even go through the effort [of trying to change 
the system] that I’ve exhibited. And this is coming from the SPAWAR 
representatives that cared and were trying to help me, who were equally 
frustrated. Because they are limited as well. Most people end up giving up, 
providing a feedback which is the only hope that there would be hope for 
innovation within this program. Because it’s waste of time [to suggest 
improvements], because at a certain point they (SPAWAR) don’t do any 
change, so it’s more work to provide the feedback, that’s gonna result in a 
change that will probably never occur, while they (the crewmembers) are 
on board. So, not only do I see centralization as a problem, but it’s almost 
a strangulation of innovation there.  
That is not even the Athena idea that I was pitching, which was something 
else. But I have concerns with regard to that. And that’s a big issue. There 
is no way that’s gonna budge, because SPAWAR owns much, fighting, 
picking a fight with them. Some people I can see even be hesitant to them 
for potential negative blow back. But I didn’t care. I was so frustrated that 
many manpower hours I was wasting doing data input and then having the 
program corrupt on me. That I, at that point really had nothing to lose. It 
just blew my mind. The inefficiencies that were allowed to exist. And 
that’s just me, and that’s doing a small job, and that’s just a tiny subset, 
and I’m just one person in this big program. I’m concerned about that for 
sure, from an innovation standpoint. (LTC, USS Nimitz) 
Navy leaders recognize the need for innovation, and Navy innovation initiatives 
range from projects anchored to the Navy’s top brass, including the Chief of Naval 
Operations’ (CNO) Rapid Innovation Cell (CRIC), to grassroots initiatives such as the 
Athena Project. 
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The CRIC was established in recognition of the combination of talented 
personnel, a need for ideas, and the multiple forces defying them. It gives selected 
personnel the opportunity to work with their ideas in a supportive climate where parts of 
the bureaucratic process have been circumvented. CRIC personnel described a 
multilayered organization where ideas and suggestions, as they travelled up the 
organization, faced multiple barriers at each level of command before they reach a 
decision maker with funds and authority to see them through. Then, as they travelled 
back down the organization again, they competed for time, interest, and commitment 
from local authorities for their execution (Kohlmann & Lademan, 2015). 
The Athena Project was initiated onboard the USS Benfold. A junior officer’s 
ambition to bring the discussions of the wardroom to a wider audience met with the CO’s 
need for new ideas to improve performance. The wardroom was buzzing with ideas that 
needed feedback, improvement, and above all, decision makers who listened (Cannon, 
2015). Both CRIC and Athena are examples of reactions to counter the challenging 
conditions that inhibit creativity and innovation in the Navy. Naturally, the Nimitz faces 
those same conditions. 
2. The Ship 
USS Nimitz is not alone at sea. The ship will always exist within a larger 
organization adding complexity, supervision, and pressure. For example, to visit the ship 
in its dock in Bremerton, one has to conform not only to the regular security requirements 
of a military base, but also the separate safety and security procedures and training of the 
shipyard, and finally, the procedures to get access to the ship itself. In the shipyard, the 
ship was crawling with contractors wearing hardhats as well as the ship crew, both doing 
their jobs while adapting to the other’s routines and procedures. 
The Nimitz’s organization includes a crew or “ship’s company” of almost 3,000 
sailors commanded by a Navy captain (the CO) assisted by his staff. The organization is 
broken down into divisions and departments based on task, role, and technical 
competency. This hierarchy creates multiple layers of command reporting up the 
organizational structure to the senior leadership. Each technical area (e.g., the Reactor 
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Division) answers through their division head and the CO to their respective ashore 
organization (e.g., the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program), while the ship also reports to 
a Naval Command. For example, when deployed, a ship reports to a Fleet which again 
reports to a Combatant Command (COCOM). During deployments, the ship will embark 
an air wing of almost 90 aircraft and 2,000 additional crewmembers—not included in 
“ship’s company.” She will sail as the flagship of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) of other 
Navy vessels commanded by a one-star admiral. The CSG commander and his/her staff 
will be embarked on the ship. The CSG will be organized by warfare areas (e.g., surface, 
sub-surface, and strike) in a composite warfare command structure. The ship must 
innovate within this complex hierarchy while answering to multiple stakeholders. 
As the first of class of the Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carriers and one of the 
world’s largest warships, the Nimitz is literally unable to fly below the radar. The Carrier 
Strike Group is a strategic pillar for U.S. Defense policy makers. The Nimitz attracts 
attention wherever she sails. The ship attracted attention by its big superstructure, which 
dominated the waterfront when it was stationed in Everett Naval Base, and its pennant 
number (68) which illuminated the night sky. Arriving in Victoria, B.C., after a short 
cruise from Everett, WA, in June 2014, local newspaper headlines indicated how quickly 
the local populace took notice of the super-sized guest. The ship not only answers to 
multiple stakeholders, but there is also the added pressure of being so prominent in the 
stakeholders’ view. 
When one boards the Nimitz, the first striking feature of the ship is its obvious 
size; a second feature is the number of people onboard: With 5,000+ souls on board, it is 
a small floating city. Then there is the challenge of finding order in what appears to be 
orchestrated chaos with similar-looking individuals moving around according to invisible 
norms and rules through a maze of ladders and corridors. One example is on the 
navigation bridge: To an outsider, the bridge seems crowded but orderly. Orders are 
passed down the bridge’s chain of command, confirmations are passed back up. Every 
command is logged, together with ship and navigational data. Personnel “in training” 
stand by, observing everything and concentrating on getting their qualifications. As a 
similarly sized Wallenius Wilhelmsen roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ship passed by, one could 
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not help but wonder whether they had a more streamlined bridge organization. The 
Nimitz is complex, but organizational structure in the form of a hierarchy soon becomes 
visible: the difference between officers and enlisted, or “khaki” versus “blue.” Privileges 
are obtained by advancement in rank; there is a big difference between the CO’s quarters 
and an enlisted bunk. This strict hierarchy implies difficulties for junior personnel in 
getting their ideas across and voicing opinions to the personnel in charge. An enlisted 
Sailor onboard admitted, “The officer and the enlisted often is a gap and divide when it 
comes to value of a person’s idea. So I think that was the trouble.” 
The sailors are unified in their training, indoctrination, uniform, and code of 
conduct. Still, a closer look reveals the communities that divide the ship into departments 
and divisions. Badges, uniforms, and locale are indicators of the different organizational 
structures that exist within the ship. Both team diversity and knowledge-sharing across 
communities may suffer in the face of this organizational structure. The CO of the Nimitz 
acknowledged that inviting outsiders onboard, in this case an NPS research team, was a 
strategy to compensate for the lack of team diversity. 
The organization is there to provide oversight and prevent anyone from getting 
lost in a large and intricate system. For a newcomer, it is easy to get lost onboard. Except 
for the cryptic numbers marking each compartment, the “bull’s eyes,” every corridor 
looks the same, the same greyish color scheme, few signs, no décor or distinguishable 
features. The uniformity invites a desire to stay within known spaces, with familiar faces, 
and accept the directions of those individuals with experience. Fortunately, most of the 
crewmembers are more than willing to give directions.  
During the first visit of the NPS research team to the Nimitz, on a quest to find a 
security office to confirm our security clearance (at least three possible candidate offices 
emerged), we quickly became lost. But soon an eager crewmember came to our 
assistance and proudly led the way up and down what seemed like endless corridors and 
passageways. The sailor eventually found all the offices we needed, but admitted it had 
taken him about six months to learn how to navigate around the ship. Knowledge and 
experience seem crucial to navigate the ship’s complexity. Similarly, in terms of 
creativity and innovation, the interviews confirmed the role of domain knowledge in 
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coming up with creative ideas. Facilitators from the Athena Project were used to provide 
knowledge on how to navigate the organization and communicate the idea to the 
leadership. 
The work environment on a nuclear aircraft carrier can be stressful. The 
individual crewmember workload reported by Shattuck et al. (2014) greatly exceeded the 
Navy standard work week, and crewmembers regularly reported being fatigued. Of 
further concern for creativity and innovation was Shattuck et al.’s finding of low 
“psychological safety”—a term comparable to participative safety (see Table 2). The 
participants were afraid to speak up and take risks. They feared that mistakes would be 
held against them. The crewmembers interviewed for this thesis confirmed that they 
worked in a stressful environment, but acknowledged that conditions had improved since 
the Shattuck et al. (2014) study. No evidence of adverse effects from stress or fear of 
speaking up was found during the interviews. In contrast, the interviewees reported that 
they felt safe and motivated to contribute to improvements. 
3. The Innovation 
Within the hull of the USS Nimitz, this thesis explored creativity and innovation 
related to a new watch standing schedule. In June 2014, a research team from NPS 
embarked on the USS Nimitz to conduct a study of sleep and fatigue among the 
crewmembers. The leadership of the Nimitz, at the time, had experienced a performance 
deviation among the crew and suspected that it could be caused by fatigue, high 
workload, and lack of sleep. Indeed, the initial NPS study described a situation of poor 
sleep hygiene, excessive fatigue, and dissatisfaction in a sample of Sailors predominantly 
from the Reactor Department (Shattuck et al., 2014). The results of the initial study led to 
a change in the watch schedule of the Reactor Department from a three-section “five and 
dime” or 5 hours on watch followed by 10 hours off watch to a four-section 3 hours on 
watch followed by 9 hours off watch or 3/9 watchbill. The decision to adopt a new 
watchbill was evaluated in a follow-up study to assess the effect of that change. As was 
confirmed by many of the participants interviewed for this thesis, the change had a 
positive effect on the sleep and performance of crewmembers (Shattuck et al., 2015). In 
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terms of novelty and usefulness, this change represents an innovation. Or, in the words of 
one Petty Officer, “If we got some new information or some results back from the study 
and then changed the watch schedule based on that, that sounds like innovation to me.” 
Changing a watch schedule may not seem like groundbreaking, “big C” creativity. 
Nonetheless, on the Nimitz, the CO decided to invite researchers onboard to conduct a 
lengthy study of the crew and employ the scientific evidence provided to support further 
decisions. When it comes to improving performance, of the many tools a Navy CO has at 
his or her disposal, this approach may not be the most obvious choice. From the 
crewmembers’ point of view, the change itself was perceived as something new, but not 
radical. What they found to be radical was the change of mindset that occurred as a result 
of the NPS study. Several small changes were conducted to accommodate first the new 
watch schedule and later the general work conditions onboard. Suddenly, individual 
crewmembers’ work–life balance, circadian rhythm, sleep, and eating habits became 
important parts of the department’s performance evaluations. 
B. THE APPLICATION OF THEORIES 
The interview data have been interpreted in light of the theoretical framework 
described in Chapter II. In this section, the data have been organized by the theories 
underlying that framework. Furthermore, the participants interviewed have been 
organized by three perspectives. This organization is inspired by how ethnographic 
researchers create personas, or archetypes, representing important and distinct characters 
that stand out from the interview data (see, for example, Liedtka & Ogilvie, 2011). The 
three perspectives are the Leader, the Athena Sailor, and the Petty Officer. 
The Leader perspective provided the big picture of the situation. It was provided 
by individuals with a long naval career and a high level of experience. They believed in 
improving the Navy by challenging the current way of business. The Athena Sailor 
provided the perspective of crewmembers participating in the Athena Project. True to the 
exploratory nature of case study methods, the Athena Sailors emerged during the study as 
having an unexpected perspective on creativity and innovation in practice. The Athena 
Sailors had different levels of experience, but came together in their passion for 
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innovation. The Petty Officer provided the perspective of the highly trained and 
professional petty officers of the Reactor Department. They offered first-hand insights 
into the events concerning sleep and performance in the Reactor Department, and 
provided a unique perspective from the deck. 
1. Individual Factors 
a. The Leader 
From the leadership’s point of view, the following individual factors were 
emphasized: motivation, willingness to take risks, knowledge, and communication. 
The CO of the USS Nimitz expressed a strong motivation to change something on 
his ship and to improve the Navy. Changes are driven by innovation, and by having a 
positive attitude towards change, the CO wanted to inspire innovative behavior in the 
organization. The leadership’s innovative nature and acceptance of risk were intended to 
“set the tone” for the crew. The CO recalled a willingness to take risks to achieve overall 
objectives already in his first command, and now, with increased experience, expressed 
confidence that accepting risk was necessary for the continued improvement of the Navy. 
Knowledge of related fields, such as management and public administration, had 
informed the CO’s command philosophy and decisions on how to innovate. In the 
business world, corporations look outside their organization for inspiration. Shouldn’t the 
Navy do the same? To gain knowledge from within his own organization, the CO 
believed in “management by walking around,” listening, and being curious. The CO, the 
executive officer (XO), and the command master chief (CMC) used forums such as the 
Captain’s Call, Division-in-the-Spotlight (DITS), and the Athena Project to communicate 
directly with the crew and identify “crew dissatisfiers.” The leadership recognized that 
the younger “millennial” generation, within which enlisted and junior officers belonged, 
demanded explanation and education rather than traditional one-way directives. The crew 
seemed to respond well to that approach. For example, in terms of changing the watch 
schedule, resistance was overcome by explaining how the sailors could benefit from the 
change, and communicating that the change was done in the interest of the welfare of the 
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crew, not for the sake of the leaders. Likewise, changes to align the ship’s and the 
Bremerton shipyard’s routines demanded explanation to be fully accepted. 
b. The Athena Sailor 
For the Athena Sailors, individual factors such as domain knowledge, personal 
experience, intrinsic motivation, and a stubborn belief in their own ideas were essential in 
transforming creative ideas into a creative product ready for implementation. In their 
peers and supervisors, they saw the value of expertise, curiosity, listening skills, and 
determination. 
The Athena Sailors’ creative products emerged from experience and knowledge in 
their field. For example, as one junior officer formulated it, “it’s based on experiences. 
Experiences they’ve had with the ship. So they have done something themselves several 
times and it never really made sense to them, to do it that way,” or more specifically, 
“That’s in fact where I got my idea. Was at last ship. Wearing a gas mask, in general 
quarters, sitting in a repair locker while everyone else was stressed out in these [other 
breathing apparatus].” (LTC, USS Nimitz). 
The Athena Sailors were motivated and committed to change their work situation 
and, ultimately, to improve the Navy: “We take innovative ideas on how to make the 
Navy and the ship yard more efficient and safer: save money” (Petty Officer A., USS 
Nimitz). 
Through the Athena process, they get valuable feedback from subject matter 
experts (SMEs) brought in to listen to their ideas: 
And so I told them my idea, they gave me some feedback and said ok. 
That sounds great, and it’s a great idea. Here are some notes for you, you 
can take back with you. Do some homework here, do some research there. 
And then we’ll meet again and we’ll refinance. That’s what I did. I took it 
back, added a little bit of homework and thinking and found some 
instructions. (Petty Officer A., USS Nimitz) 
The sailors and their ideas benefitted from leaders who were supportive, curious, 
and listening instead of judging. One Athena Sailor reflected that: “So my CO … is very 
open and supportive of those ideas and has a tremendous amount of my respect for that.” 
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Finally, during implementation, the ideas benefitted from “strong leadership from 
CO, XO, RO and then insuring that chiefs bought off on it and changed the mindset and 
the culture that existed” (LTC, USS Nimitz). 
c. The Petty Officer 
The petty officers of the Reactor Department identified domain knowledge and 
openness to change as individual factors that influenced creativity and innovation.  
Nuclear reactor operators are held to high standards. The interviewees reported 
that they were specially selected and received up to two years of training before they 
were allowed to stand watch. They expressed professionalism in how they described their 
work, and appeared to value expertise. Their emphasis on expertise, however, made them 
prone to believe that changes, even for the good, were very difficult to accomplish. For 
example, “There may be a better way to perform the procedure, but if we know the 
procedure works the way it’s written, it’s probably not gonna change.” The mindset they 
reflected was that expertise and knowledge come with experience, and sit at the top of the 
hierarchy: 
In (the) reactor department we pretty much have everything by the book. 
We don’t touch anything and do anything unless we have a book open that 
tells us exactly what to do and how to do it. We always try to harp on the 
fact that the books are written by experts. So, it’s hard to say: “I think we 
should do it in a different way,” when they have a book that a lot of smart 
and high rated people say that is how you’re supposed to do it. (Petty 
Officer R., USS Nimitz) 
The same professionalism made the Petty Officers willing to raise issues related 
to work performance (e.g., issues related to safety or maintenance), but only if those 
issues did not involve procedural changes. Procedural changes involved a long, but 
professionally justified, struggle against a very bureaucratic and conservative culture—a 
culture that was often carried on the shoulders of individuals with a conservative mindset 
closed to creativity and innovation. Repeatedly, the Petty Officers reflected on the lack of 
an open mindset among chiefs and officers in their department: 
They are very resistant to change. They have this mindset of “this is the 
way we have always done it. It has always worked before, so we just keep 
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doing it.” So if they had a more open mindset, it would be easier to get 
them to change a little bit. 
Just because it’s the way it has always been done, doesn’t necessarily 
mean that it’s the best way. 
They are trapped in it, and can’t get free of it. So they need to try to be 
more open to change. Even if it is a little scary. You know it could be 
good. Could be bad. Give it a shot. (Petty Officer G., USS Nimitz) 
2. Team/Groups 
a. The Leader 
The interviews of the leadership revealed that team factors influencing creativity 
and innovation were team diversity, shared vision, pressure, and supervisory 
encouragement. 
A shared military background “cuts off the edges” and reduces team diversity. As 
demonstrated by inviting the NPS research team onboard, it felt natural for the leaders to 
look outside the ship for inputs. Outsiders were used to reduce the risk of “group think” 
and introduce diverse opinions. Team alignment was still found necessary. Shared goals 
and vision were provided by a command philosophy tailored to the situation. The 
command philosophy was the leaders’ “alignment tool” intended to “get the message 
down” and steer the innovations towards a set course. Furthermore, the command 
philosophy was a way to remind the crew of the importance of the ship’s overall mission. 
The philosophy, together with an expressed expectancy of high standards, created a 
pressure to perform and maintain readiness. For example, the CO wanted to personally 
make sure the ship was kept clean, tidy, and “that the lights were off in the berthing 
areas.” 
Most prominent among the team factors was supervisory encouragement. The CO 
felt he had “top cover” from his own leadership, the admiral in charge of all nuclear 
reactors, telling him to think differently, “challenge my [the admiral’s] perception,” and 
“challenge the way we do business.” Instilling a similar climate of participative safety for 
creativity and innovation was a management goal onboard. The leadership wanted to hear 
suggestions for improvement from the crew instead of imposing solutions. Creative ideas 
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should, in the CO’s mind, be encouraged and rewarded: “Don’t shoot the messenger,” 
and “be willing to challenge all assumptions.” In fact, the leaders felt that after 
encouragement, the situation went from “no one would say anything” to almost too many 
suggestions. 
b. The Athena Sailor 
The Athena Project is about creating a supportive, safe environment and bringing 
together a team with diverse, but complementary knowledge.  
On one occasion, the Athena meeting was held in a coffee house with 
representatives from other ships, the shore-based organization, and industry. The climate 
of the meeting was that of collaboration and contribution as opposed to criticism and 
judging. Back onboard the Nimitz, the meetings were typically set up as round table 
discussions. The Athena Sailors met with the upper chain-of-command (typically the CO, 
XO, and CMC), domain experts from the ship, and other interested crewmembers. The 
atmosphere was similar to that of the coffee house, supportive rather than judging. A 
junior officer onboard described the meeting as follows: 
It’s very much … like a round table of discussion you have with your 
leadership. They want to get the idea pushed through. They don’t want to 
see your PowerPoint, they don’t see that. They want to sit down and 
actually talk to individuals. 
The opportunity to meet with the leadership and the feeling of being heard 
seemed to be intrinsically motivating for the Athena Sailors. 
c. The Petty Officer 
When the Reactor Department is interpreted as a group or team trying to innovate 
together, the following factors surface: common goal/vision, participative safety, 
organizational impediments, resource constraints, task irrelevant behavior, and freeriding. 
The most prominent factor was the emphasis the interviewees placed on the 
common goal of safety and stability in performance. When an idea contributed to that 
goal, they felt safe and obliged to voice their opinions and participate in finding a 
solution. The feeling of participative safety was reflected in how, in their opinion, 
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changing of the watch schedule went from a top-down directive to a bottom-up, 
participative approach when it was interpreted as contributing to the common goal. The 
belief in a participative innovation process decreased when organizational impediments 
such as a tedious bureaucracy were believed to block the process, for example, changing 
written procedures involving decisions above their local level of authority. 
Most of the Petty Officers reported resource constraints regarding manpower and 
personnel as negatively influencing creativity and innovation. The lack of personnel with 
the right qualifications meant that they were not able to change or experiment with new 
solutions. One Petty Officer described how task-irrelevant behavior affected the ability to 
change: 
Like I said, they are resistant to changing the old ways because it’s the 
way it’s always been done. Kind of like the situation we sometimes have, 
where senior personnel are mean to the non-quals because they have 
gotten trash by the people ahead of them and so they feel that they have to 
keep doing it. We don’t do that now. We kind of broke that when some 
certain people left. 
Another participant described a situation where his team was freeriding on a 
watch scheduling solution for a while, but then gave up due to lack of motivation to 
improve the situation. 
3. Organization/Culture 
a. The Leader 
Innovation in the Navy is challenged by a risk averse organization. Still, onboard 
the Nimitz, the Leader wanted to encourage innovative behavior. A transformational 
leadership style was adopted to support creativity and innovation. 
Despite individual Navy leaders’ support for independent thinking, in general 
terms, it was voiced that “the Navy is breeding risk out of leadership.” The Navy seems 
to prefer streamlined, uniform leaders compared to, for example, the strong personalities 
of World War II admirals. From the wider organization, there was pressure on the Nimitz 
to conform, with simultaneous pressure to perform by setting an example for others. 
Within this organization, the leadership of the Nimitz wanted to create a culture with 
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perceived support for creative initiatives. Communication, intrinsic motivation, and 
education were among the chosen management strategies. By hearing out the crew’s 
suggestions and keeping an open dialogue, the leadership hoped to inspire creative ideas 
and ease their implementation. Traditional organizational barriers were broken down by 
DITS or Captain’s Calls. The transformational leadership style was prioritized over the 
transactional, order-driven leadership style inherent in most of the military organization. 
b. The Athena Sailor 
The Athena Sailors witnessed how the traditions, hierarchy, and bureaucracy of 
the military organization kept new ideas from being brought forward. They saw big Navy 
issues hindering implementation. They feared that an inwardly focused Navy will never 
be able to innovate. They were motivated by a very supportive upper chain-of-command, 
which was fortunate in a culture they described as very leader-dependent. 
The Athena Project was designed to circumvent the barriers to innovation 
inherent in the military organization (see also Cannon, 2015.) For those fortunate enough 
to be involved, the Athena Project took the ideas straight to the CO and past the 
treacherous waters of tradition and the multiple layers of the chain-of-command. From 
the perspective of the Athena Sailors, 
I tried a couple of times to do something like this beforehand. And it was 
shut down by my chain of command. More or less just told: “This is the 
way we’ve always done it. Keep it traditional.” In contrast with what the 
Athena Project wanted to achieve: “We take innovative ideas …, and we 
put that in like a pipe line to make the change happen.” Which is opposed 
to the rank structure and all the paper work and all the unnecessary things 
that would just take so much time, we pipeline it straight to the source of 
change. 
Still, if an idea was regarded as “against written regulations,” the Athena Project 
was less willing to take up the fight.  
In implementation, the support from the CO, and the execution of the XO and 
CMC meant everything to the sailors. However, when it came to ideas that involved the 
larger naval organization, for example regarding firefighting and personal safety 
equipment, the defense acquisition system and the Navy’s preference for maintaining the 
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status quo presented almost watertight barriers that proved virtually impossible to 
overcome. 
c. The Petty Officer 
Viewed from the lens of organizational factors, the Petty Officers told the story of 
complexity, leader-dependence, both transactional and transformational leadership, and a 
high degree of conservatism. 
The Nimitz was described as a complex organization to which the Reactor 
Department had to adapt. Changing the watch schedule affected most other department 
activities, for instance, maintenance, drills, training, and watch rotations. The Reactor 
Department activities were in turn affected by shipboard activities, examples of which 
were flight operations, meals, general quarter drills, use of the announcement circuit 
(1MC), and other scheduled ship events. The department was therefore highly reliant on 
the XO’s willingness to adjust the ship’s schedule to the department’s new watch 
schedule. Fortunately, they had leadership support: “The final thing that they changed is 
the time when we ran general quarter drills to be more in line with the sleeping/waking 
rhythm of the watch teams” (Petty Officer J., USS Nimitz). 
In changing the watch schedule, the Petty Officers saw an initiative that was 
“brought down from our leadership through the chain-of-command.” They felt the change 
was coming from the CO, XO, and Reactor Officer (RO), and consequently had to be 
implemented regardless of resistance. Then, as the change had leadership support, the 
Petty Officers felt responsible for adopting and improving it. In their opinion, the 
organization was too large and complex for higher level decision makers to understand 
fully the effect the change could have on those directly influenced. For the innovation to 
be successful, it had to be driven by the “lowest supervisory level.” Still, they felt 
motivated by the fact that the leadership was trying “to improve your quality of life,” and 
from their interview answers, it was evident that they had adopted and were defending 
the ideas behind the change. 
Creativity and innovation in the Reactor Department met its fiercest opponent in 
the department’s conservative culture. The department and the wider nuclear organization 
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were defending the status quo and were almost locked to procedures, historical 
performance, rules, and regulations. The interviewees described a long and tedious 
process for change: “It could take months. It could take years.” They needed very good 
reasons to suggest changing a written procedure: 
There may be a better way to perform the procedure, but if we know the 
procedure works the way it’s written, it’s probably not gonna change. 
(Petty Officer G., USS Nimitz) 
Very, very difficult to change. In my opinion. And the reason is that for 
however many years naval nuclear power has existed, a lot of things exist 
the way now because of lessons we learnt in the past. So, the procedures 
that are implemented now exist or at least seem to exist for a reason. So, 
the moment you want to change the way we operate you find a lot of 
hesitation. One, because people who work now may or may not know the 
lessons learnt, so changing something without knowing the history of it, 
can frighten people. So you find the first hesitation there, and then 
secondly if you look at, I guess, the track record of it, it seems that for the 
most part this program has existed relatively incident free with regards to 
the public and public safety. So, to change something in our policies and 
procedures you’ll find hesitation because we have a successful record. 
(Petty Officer G., USS Nimitz) 
Smaller changes, not bound by rules and regulations to the same degree, could be 
easier to approve, but still hard to implement: 
Small changes are definitely easier. First of all because of the things I just 
mentioned before, but also as you start to implement those bigger and 
bigger changes it needs more approval. And you’ll find that, because there 
is such great complexity to the organization, that if you were to implement 
a change, or a sweeping change, it’s hard, I feel for the higher level 
supervisors, to really understand how that change is gonna impact down at 
the very bottom. So you’ll find that those changes are often harder to 
implement. (Petty Officer G., USS Nimitz) 
Nevertheless, the Petty Officers supported the rationale behind the conservatism. 
The profession had a tradition of thoroughness, safety, high performance, and scrutiny. 
Or, as one participant formulated it, “I guess nuclear power is little bit delicate.” 
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4. Dialectic Approach 
a. The Leader 
From the Leader interview data, ambidexterity was visible in the changing roles 
innovation demanded. Both the transformational and the transactional leader were 
needed. While necessary for innovation, intellectual ambidexterity is believed to cause 
tension (Bledow et al., 2009). Listening, communicating, and idea-generating behavior 
were balanced against rapid implementation through the chain-of-command. The CO 
wanted to have time to listen to new ideas, and to provide time for crewmembers to 
pursue ideas while simultaneously managing the ship’s limited time and manpower 
resources as efficiently as possible. Similarly, the emphasis on direct communication 
with crewmembers implied a desire for a flatter organization compared to the current top-
down organization focused on efficient order execution. The CO’s strategy was to trust 
his subordinate leaders to know his intentions, solve problems at the lowest possible 
level, and have the required experience to confidently filter ideas before they reached 
him. 
b. The Athena Sailor 
The Athena Project onboard the Nimitz can be interpreted as a strategy similar to 
what Bledow et al. (2009) called the principle of overcoming dichotomous “either/or 
thinking” when faced with activities regarded as contradictory. The Athena Sailors 
preferred an informal Leader who listened to their individual needs without the normal 
gap between subordinate and supervisor. Yet, they needed a leadership that could give 
orders and “make it happen.” They wanted the CO’s personal attention, but realized his 
constraints in running a ship with a complement of about 3,000 men and women. They 
recognized the importance of performance stability for a nuclear carrier, but also 
understood the need for improvements through change. As one Athena Sailor put it, 
The CO does not necessarily realize what an E3 or E4 is doing. He has 
much larger things to worry about. … but it’s also about being efficient 
and also about innovations. So he didn’t realize that we were wasting 
those hours. And I couldn’t get the information to him through the chain 
of command. (Petty Officer A., USS Nimitz) 
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c. The Petty Officer 
The dialectic approach to creativity extracts a few significant observations from 
the Petty Officer data. The Reactor Department had to balance the objective of 
improvement against safe and stable performance. They had a very rigid, conservative 
culture, but were still able to conduct changes when needed. The changes were possible 
when an issue addressed the overall goal of safety and performance, and when the issue 
could be solved without involving the larger naval nuclear organization. The department 
seemed to have adopted a separate process for more rapid changes of a smaller scale. 
Like I said, the nuclear Navy is a very conservative organization by 
nature. Because what we do is so sensitive. But there is a very large inertia 
that has to be overcome. And the general culture is frequently that if 
something is working out, there is no need to rock the boat or upset things 
in order to maybe make some small improvements. Now on the flip side, 
when something is obviously a problem, I think, that if it is recognized by 
the chain of command that something is clearly not working. So if you say 
you want to do a maintenance [procedure] and you find out that the 
procedure can’t just be done as written, there’s something wrong there. It 
is a fairly straightforward process to get that changed. (Petty Officer J., 
USS Nimitz) 
The interesting aspect of this observation is that when issues surrounding sleep 
and workload were associated with the department’s goal of safety and performance, the 
gates to innovation were opened. The mindset had changed and creative ideas were 
encouraged. 
5. Investment Theory 
a. The Leader 
Seen through the lens of the investment theory, the Nimitz leadership had two 
strategies to promote creativity and innovation: first to create a safe environment, and 
second to create a demand for innovation. 
The Leader wanted to encourage and reward creative ideas. Leadership wanted to 
show that they valued diverse opinions. By doing so, the threshold for voicing opinions 
and suggestions was lowered. Secondly, the CO had the opinion that “you need the 
willingness to look for trouble,” and “catastrophe opens the window for change.” When 
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“bad things” or a crisis situation have shifted the organization away from its status quo, 
the cost of staying put is perceived as higher compared to the cost of trying something 
new. 
The CO introduced the idea that the U.S. Navy is under constant pressure from 
strategic, political, and economic forces. In his command philosophy, he underlined that 
his ship operated in world of uncertainty. Consequently, the risk associated with 
stagnation was greater than the risk associated with being innovative. In the situation 
leading up to changing the watch schedule, the CO saw a window of opportunity: “The 
situation demanded a rudder change.” It was an opportunity to turn things around, take 
risk, and improve the running of the ship. Other ships have failed in in their attempt to 
change the watch schedule. The CO speculated whether those ships only took half 
measures. When the innovation process had started, it was important to keep the 
momentum, “give full rudder,” and “embrace the change.” 
The creative ideas onboard the Nimitz were not limited to changing the watch 
schedule. There was a series of ideas, from inviting researchers to assess the situation, 
changing to a 3/9 schedule, assessing the implication of the change, to continuing to do 
small changes inspired by the sleep and fatigue studies. The leadership wanted to turn a 
problem into an opportunity for improvement. The initial implementation might prove to 
be painful, but they wanted to embrace the change and continue to build on it. In this 
way, they could keep the momentum and reduce the pain by introducing minor 
increments designed to lessen resistance. The initial change of watch schedule was 
supported by changes to the usage of 1MC (shipboard public address system) during 
shared awake hours. Loud general announcements should not disrupt the sleep of those 
who were off duty. Further incremental steps towards better sleep quality were discussed. 
A reduction of ambient noise and light was introduced as another possible area of 
improvement. The leadership was also receptive to look into new berthing arrangements 
to allow for fewer interruptions for those off duty. Further changes would then be 
necessary to support the new arrangements. The new ideas were challenging to 
implement and met resistance, but the leadership felt that they needed to keep the 
momentum and make adjustments as the process went along. Interestingly, one of the 
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changes that met the most resistance was an adjustment to how the evening prayer was 
conducted. A change was made to make the evening prayer more in sync with the new 
watch schedule. Because the evening prayer is such an important part of Navy tradition, 
this change was resisted. 
b. The Athena Sailor 
There is a cost, even for Athena Sailors, to defying established norms. The Athena 
Project was used to break down the barriers between junior and senior personnel and to 
make it easier to come forward with new ideas. The project created a norm of coming up 
with ideas, and a safe environment for pursuing them. Facilitators made sure that the 
sailors were prepared to meet with the upper chain-of-command by doing dry-runs and 
making sure the sailors “spoke a language” that resonated with the leadership. Backed up 
by the Athena Project, it became easier to overcome resistance: 
I know the maintenance department on the ship originally was not sure if 
this idea would work. Because we have always accomplished our 
inspections the other way with using two people. And they did not want 
to, the inspectors themselves, they did not want them to be less effective. 
So there was some resistance. (Ensign P., USS Nimitz) 
So once I had done the Athena Project, I had an officer on my side. I had 
LT N. He has more the will power to go and talk to the CO directly and 
say: “Hey captain, we have had a sailor who has this great idea that I 
really would like you to hear if you have some time.” So it took about a 
week or so to meet with the CO, but once I had seen him, he was all about 
hearing. He said, “I had no idea this was what was going on. That this was 
the reality. Thank you for bringing this to my attention. Let’s make some 
changes.” 
That is the great thing about the Athena Project. It takes a lot of enlisted 
and even officers or junior sailors who have great ideas that are just too 
afraid to speak out. And this allows them to speak to people on a 
comfortable level and they connect them with certain people to make 
those changes happen. (Petty Officer A., USS Nimitz) 
c. The Petty Officer 
The changes in the Reactor Department can be said to have followed a pattern 
similar to that illustrated by the investment theory. Furthermore, as with the Leaders, the 
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Petty Officers realized the value of keeping momentum and presenting an issue as a 
bigger problem. 
Initially, the reception towards the sleep study and changing the watch schedule 
was mixed. Early adopters would buy in to the idea rapidly, some would stay 
indifferently, but for others the transition was hard. The wheel was turning slowly and 
top-down pressure was needed. Eventually, the attitude changed, more people came 
aboard, and it became a comprehensive, collaborative effort towards improving work 
conditions in general. The new idea had been incorporated as a part of the current 
knowledge. Some of the Petty Officers interpreted the change as the result of many small 
steps towards something very innovative. They saw a need for keeping up the momentum 
with constant improvements. Others felt that as long the department members were 
unsatisfied with their current situation, and sensed a chance of improvement, the risk of 
change appeared as less threatening. One Petty Officer echoed the CO’s opinion on the 
need of a crisis situation to motivate innovation: 
The only real frustration we ran into with trying to innovate is, like I said, 
that there is generally a lot of resistance to it if there isn’t a big glaring 
problem. It can be hard to make the kind of slow gradual improvement. 
You would prefer, I suppose, [to instead let] the system break entirely 
before we overhaul it. That would be the only thing I would add. 
It has to be a big issue, it seems like. You know it’s kind of harder to get 
things done when it’s smaller, like I said, if it’s not fixing a glaring 
problem. Then there is a lot more resistance. (Petty Officer J., USS 
Nimitz) 
6. Process View 
a. The Leader 
When the process of creating ideas is held separate from the process of 
implementing ideas, it becomes evident that the leadership has employed new processes 
for idea generation, but kept the implementation process relatively unchanged. Idea 
generation or exploration had acquired avenues, for example, DITS or the Athena 
Project, separate from the ordinary chain-of-command. The leadership employed these 
avenues to “help ideas bubble up the organization.” The new avenues supported 
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inspiration, ideation, and initial evaluation, but not the implementation of ideas. For the 
implementation of new, untried ideas, the leadership had confidence in the ability of the 
chain-of-command to let the ideas drip back down again 
b. The Athena Sailor 
On the Nimitz, the Athena Project was a process for idea generation, initial 
evaluation, and feedback. In Athena, they had a mentoring process of improving their 
ideas and eventually presenting them to the CO. The implementation process, however, 
was conducted traditionally via the chain-of-command. Similarly, ideas that went beyond 
the scope of the ship had to rely on the Navy’s existing processes for implementation. 
This observation is similar to how the overall Athena Project is described by Cannon 
(2015) in his case study of the Athena Project itself. Athena helped creative ideas to 
become noticed by the Navy’s top management. On the way up, the ideas benefitted from 
feedback and support, but the implementation of the ideas seemed to meet resistance. 
Innovation was still inhibited by a slow-moving hierarchical process. Onboard the 
Nimitz, the idea exploration stage was, for those involved with the Athena Project, 
perceived as successful. When questioned whether having the Athena Project affected 
how people onboard respond to new ideas in general, the answer was, 
I think so, yes. Because it gives our junior sailors the chance to present 
ideas. Regardless of their rank. That they are able to come forth with ideas 
and I think it gives them an avenue to present ideas to a wide audience. 
(Ensign P., USS Nimitz) 
Nevertheless, the idea exploitation stage, from the CO’s decision down through 
the organization’s layers, was not always perceived as the most effective. Two 
contrasting viewpoints were provided. According to one Petty Officer, in his department, 
a particular innovation was executed without resistance: 
I basically pictured that idea to the commanding officer and he really liked 
it. And he told the people who needed to be told: “Make it happen!” And 
that’s what happened. That’s what we are doing now. We are saving a lot 
of man-hours and overall, the material readiness condition is improving 
because we have trained and professional people doing the recording. 
(Petty Officer A. USS Nimitz) 
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That would be the 3MC. He’s the maintenance material management 
coordinator for the ship. And he is in overall charge of zone inspections, 
and he reports directly to the 3MO which is the maintenance material 
management officer and he reports to the executive officer. So the 3MO 
and the 3MC kind of work together. The XO had told him “Hey, so here is 
the idea. Here it is on paper. I want you to fuse it into zone inspection.” 
And he, the 3MC, is the one who makes the necessary changes. They 
basically just took my idea and sent it out to all the departments and said, 
“Hey, this is how we are going to do zone now.” (Petty Officer A. USS 
Nimitz) 
The departments will disseminate it accordingly. … Basically it’s just the 
flow of command from the officers to department head and they are 
making sure to train the individuals that needed to be trained to get the job 
done. (Petty Officer A. USS Nimitz) 
Unfortunately, in another department of the ship, the implementation of that same 
innovation did not go as smoothly: 
I saw it from inception, to proposal to Athena, to proposal to commanding 
officer, to buy off, to the entire chain of command, to the subsequent 
trickle down to the department heads, and then down to lower level middle 
management, like myself, junior officers and chiefs and my perspective is 
limited to my department and my perspective is not a slide on any one 
individual in particular. But I had to laugh when it was presented by my 
own department head and totally written off and it didn’t go anywhere 
from that point forward. 
It was kind of written off more so because I think there was not full 
understanding of how it was to be enacted. There was a significant delay 
in implementing that. (LTC, USS Nimitz) 
c. The Petty Officer 
From a process viewpoint, the Reactor Department had two different processes 
for creativity and innovation. There was a very bureaucratic process for changes to 
procedures and a more rapid process for smaller changes. Both type of changes had to 
support the department’s goals, but the smaller changes did not involve the rigid, larger 
nuclear organization. The problem with the rapid process was that it did not include 
changes that “only” affected quality of life. As mentioned earlier in this chapter under the 
discussion of the dialectic approach, the mindset changed when sleep issues were 
incorporated as a performance and safety factor. Suddenly, a more comprehensive view 
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on human performance—including work-life balance, rest, and recovery—was taken, and 
suggestions for improvements were welcomed. The change in attitude was illustrated by 
how human factors had become a natural part of performance evaluations:  
And we’ve had some problems with people recently in maintenance. So 
now they ask usually at a brief “Were you on duty last night? If so, how 
long were you on watch and how much sleep did you get? How tired are 
you? Are you hungry?” So I think they have become a little more careful 
about the actual condition of the people doing the maintenance. So I think 
they are starting to pay attention a little bit more to it. Instead of just 
assuming that we are ready to go at all times. (Petty Officer G., USS 
Nimitz) 
C. CONCLUSION 
The story about the Nimitz is a story about motivation. It is about having top 
cover from leaders promoting an innovative mindset. It is about the ship’s own 
leadership’s intrinsic motivation to promote change and to encourage innovative 
behavior. It is also a story about a complex organization within an environment where 
creativity and innovation struggle to surface. Even in such an environment, ideas may 
bubble up to the decision makers. On the Nimitz, the leadership successfully introduced 
processes to steer the ideas around the many obstacles the organization presented them 
with. Some ideas, however, collided with a very conservative and rigid mindset. Once 
more, top cover from the decision makers and, this time, also from the alignment of 
departmental goals to the idea’s purpose, came to the rescue. 
The story about the Nimitz is about a very leader-dependent culture. True 
leadership was needed to trigger changes and “rock the boat,” to enforce a difficult 
implementation process and, above all, to close the circle. Leadership needed to listen, 
encourage, and inspire intrinsic motivation for innovation among the crew.  
It is also about how innovation—implementing creatively—differs from fostering 
creativity. As the “I had to laugh” quote shows, the Nimitz was better at fostering 
creativity than implementing the innovation. The forces that defy innovation may be 
stronger than those that discourage creativity.  
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, I embarked with the question, what conditions set the stage for 
creativity and innovation in the Navy? The question was answered by the case study of 
USS Nimitz. During that pursuit, I found a rich source of creativity research sharing a 
military origin. Unfortunately, military innovation studies and creativity research seemed 
to have parted, and the military innovation studies seemed to have ignored a well of 
theories that could have been used to better explain and communicate their findings. In an 
effort to bring them closer together, I investigated creativity research and formulated a 
theoretical framework that I propose can be used to describe military innovation. 
Creativity and innovation, as well as human interaction, are unique, context-dependent 
phenomenon, well-suited for examination by case study methodology. In this case study, 
data were primarily gathered by open-ended interviews. The theoretical framework 
guided the interviews and their analysis, and it helped to structure and communicate the 
results. 
A. DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
1. Definitions and Measurements 
Definitions and measurements are not theories on their own and do not by 
themselves expose any conditions required for creativity and innovation onboard the 
Nimitz. Nevertheless, they were a fundamental part of the theoretical framework. Clear, 
concise, theory-driven definitions were invaluable in providing consistency and clarity. 
Moreover, they provided the lens for interpreting the participants’ stories, and sharing 
them without having to rely on military jargon, layman terms, or imprecise terminology.  
Measurements were the part of the framework that contributed the least to the 
case. The findings did reveal that two objective measures of usefulness, or the quality 
part of creativity, were used. Those were the assessment of the effects of changing the 
watch schedule (documented by Shattuck et al., 2014, and Shattuck et al., 2015), and the 
reduction in man-hours (450) for a novel inspection approach. It would be tempting to 
say that objective confirmation of positive effects improved idea implementation, but the 
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data provided little support for or against that thought. Apart from subjective statements 
of ideas being more or less novel, the novelty of ideas was not measured. From this case 
study, it was difficult to determine the potential effect of such assessments. 
2. Factor Theory 
Factor theory was probably the most comprehensive part of the framework. 
Seeing the data through factor theory provided the greatest number of findings about 
conditions for creativity and innovation onboard the ship. Factor theory gave the 
opportunity to focus on the different levels—from individual to culture—in turn. All the 
levels turned out to be essential for the study. Important insights could have been 
overlooked if the theoretical framework had excluded any of the levels. Additionally, 
certain factors, such as conservative mindset, could be interpreted as both an individual 
and organizational trait, and the possible interaction between the two became more 
evident. 
The following were the most prevailing positive factors for creativity and 
innovation to occur: 
• Intrinsic motivation to offer new ideas and suggestions to improve the local 
work situation and subsequently the Navy 
• A leadership willing to take risk in order to improve 
• Diverse, relevant domain knowledge and expertise, availability of subject matter 
experts, and the willingness to seek out knowledge outside and within the 
organization 
• A leader-driven shared goal and vision to bring everyone aboard and align ideas 
with overall objectives 
• A climate of participative safety that encourages ideation 
• Predominantly transformational leadership encouraging contributions combined 
with transactional leadership intervention 
The following were the most prevailing negative factors: 
• An individual mindset opposed to change (possibly influenced by a conservative 
culture) 
• Organizational impediments such as hierarchy, traditions, and tedious procedure 
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• A conservative culture that values tradition, status quo, and bureaucracy 
• A complex and leader-dependent organization 
3. The Dialectic Approach 
Interpreting the case with the dialectic approach as an anchor made it possible to 
contrast various factors. For example, the factor theory perspective found that two 
opposite management styles—transactional and transformational—were required. The 
dialectic approach underlined the paradoxes that a desire for creativity and innovation 
bring to the table. The organization, especially the leadership, is pulled between demands 
for competing management styles and resources (e.g., time and attention, and 
organizational structures). The dialectic approach highlighted the need to balance the 
objectives of safe, stable performance and dynamic improvements. When the Reactor 
Department realized that the latter could lead to the first, that is, aligning continuous 
human factors improvements to the overall goal of safety and performance, collaborative 
efforts followed. 
4. Investment Theory 
The case of the Nimitz can be interpreted as investment theory in practice. 
Resistance and doubt were gradually turned into participation. Communication of intents 
and benefits, education, and directives took the idea, relatively quickly, from a hypothesis 
defying old knowledge to accepted common wisdom. Onboard, participative safety 
increased when spaces for creativity were created, barriers between leadership and crew 
were broken down, and the promotion of new ideas was encouraged. According to 
investment theory, an investor would like to buy low and sell high. Ideas became easier 
to sell in an environment of participative safety. Ideas became cheap when the current 
situation was defined as a crisis. A sense of urgency created a demand for innovation, and 
the cost of following in the wake of others—stagnation—seemed higher than trying 
something new. Then, once the ship had started moving, both the Leader and the Petty 
Officer considered it essential to keep momentum and continue to innovate and evolve. 
 84 
5. Process View 
The USS Nimitz incorporated separate idea generation and implementation 
processes. Challenges in getting ideas to the leadership led to improvements to the 
process for idea generation, but, in spite of some inefficiency, the implementation process 
was kept the same. Onboard, organizational layers presented barriers to implementation. 
Off the ship, big Navy’s bureaucracy added to the challenge. The Reactor Department 
employed a particularly rigid process for procedural changes, but minor improvements 
that could be integrated without big Navy involvement were dealt with effectively—if 
those changes were found to contribute positively to safety and performance. The process 
view complemented the dialectic approach in shedding light on an interesting 
phenomenon. When the goals of the Reactor Department were found to be in alignment 
with the ideas planted by the NPS sleep study, the mindset changed and suggestions for 
improvement were welcomed. This insight could easily have been overlooked without the 
process view and the dialectic approach included in the theoretical framework. It 
demonstrates the descriptive power of the framework and the value of case study 
research. 
B. CONCLUSION 
A goal of this thesis was to introduce a language for thinking and talking about 
creativity and innovation in the military. The conditions under which creativity and 
innovation occur are better understood now that they can be viewed through a theoretical 
framework based on current creativity research. We can safely conclude that theories and 
perspectives from the broad research on creativity and innovation can be used to explain 
a case of military innovation. 
Guided by the framework, the case study showed that there are strong forces in 
the Navy resisting change and defending the status quo. It is challenging to implement 
new ideas. Still, it is possible to outmaneuver the hierarchy and bring ideas and 
suggestions straight to the CO’s attention. Faced with the most conservative culture, it is 
possible to create a climate of intrinsic motivation where individuals think their ideas can 
make a difference. 
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The USS Nimitz innovated by adhering to factors such as intrinsic motivation and 
participative safety. By that measure, the case study echoed the findings of broad 
creativity research. Other factors, like transactional leadership, were more rarely given 
priority by previous studies. The unique military context of the case study made the role 
of transactional leadership more apparent. More surprising was how clear the process 
view illuminated the difference in the Nimitz’s approaches to idea generation and 
implementation. Initiatives like the Athena Project made the generation of new ideas 
considerably less stressful and more effective. On the other hand, the implementation of 
those potentially radical ideas was entrusted to the established, traditional process. 
Finally, mostly unexpected was the insight about the positive effect that the alignment of 
goals and ideas had on participative safety. When goals and ideas were aligned, the crew 
of the Nimitz was able to innovate by taking advantage of existing efficient processes. 
One potential critique of these findings is that only a small subset of officers and 
enlisted onboard a big ship, in an even larger navy, was interviewed. Even so, the case 
provided unique perspectives and insights, which a larger, homogeneous, random sample 
would be unlikely to uncover. Moreover, all four cornerstones of the framework were 
found to produce valid insights about the case.  
There is always a risk that a confirmatory bias is present, and, subsequently, that 
some elements of the framework have received more praise than they deserve. In the 
thesis’ defense, it should be noted that it is a descriptive case study. It did not try to prove 
a theory as right or wrong. It has just described the case from different angles, trusting in 
triangulation to enhance the reader’s understanding. 
Creativity is the production of something both novel and useful (Amabile et al., 
1996). This thesis is novel in its formulation of a framework based on creativity research 
to investigate a case of military innovation. It is also novel in its definition of creativity 
and innovation as a part of HSI, and its use of case study as its research design. Useful 
and valuable insights were found through the interpretation of data and the 
communication of the findings with the language established by creativity researchers. 
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“Try to be more open to change. Even if it is a little scary. You know, it could be 
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